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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Why are the Twin Cities so segregated?1 The Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul metropolitan area is known for its progressive politics and 
forward-thinking approach to regional planning, but these features 
have not prevented the formation of some of the nation’s widest 
racial disparities and the nation’s worst segregation in a 
predominantly white area.2 On measures of educational and 
residential integration, the Twin Cities region has rapidly diverged 
from other regions with similar demographics, such as Portland or 
       †   Myron Orfield is the Earl R. Larson Professor of Law at the University of 
Minnesota Law School and the Director of the Institute on Metropolitan 
Opportunity. 
      ††  Will Stancil is a Research Fellow at the Institute on Metropolitan 
Opportunity. 
1.  This article is adapted from a report issued by the Institute on
Metropolitan Opportunity (“IMO”) at the University of Minnesota Law School. See 
INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED? (2015), 
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/ed/00/ed00c05a000fffeb881655f2e02e9f29 
/Why-Are-the-Twin-Cities-So-Segregated-2-26-15.pdf.  
2.  See infra Part II.
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Seattle.3 Since the start of the twenty-first century, the number of 
severely segregated schools in the Twin Cities area has increased 
more than seven-fold; the population of segregated, high-poverty 
neighborhoods has tripled.4 The concentration of black families in 
low-income areas has grown for over a decade; in Portland and 
Seattle, it has declined.5 In 2010, the Minneapolis-Saint Paul region 
had eighty-three schools made up of ninety percent nonwhite 
students; Portland had two.6 
The following article explains this paradox. In doing so, it 
broadly describes the history and structure of two growing industry 
pressure groups within the Twin Cities political scene: the poverty 
housing industry (PHI)7 and the poverty education complex 
(PEC).8 It shows how these powerful special interests have worked 
with local, regional, and state government to preserve the 
segregated status quo and in the process have undermined school 
integration and sabotaged the nation’s most effective regional 
housing integration program.9 Finally, in what should serve as a call 
to action on civil rights, this article demonstrates how even 
moderate efforts to achieve racial integration could dramatically 
reduce regional segregation and the associated racial disparities.10 
Although the Twin Cities were committed to civil rights and 
racial integration through much of the 1970s, this commitment 
began to collapse in the mid-1980s. Political apathy about racial 
equality was accompanied by exclusionary housing practices in the 
3.  See infra Part II.
4.  METRO. COUNCIL, CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY: AN EQUITY 
ASSESSMENT OF THE TWIN CITIES REGION, SECTION FIVE: RACIALLY CONCENTRATED 
AREAS OF POVERTY IN THE REGION 5 (2014), http://www.metrocouncil.org 
/METC/files/35/35358ee4-7976-42e6-999d-9e54790d45fe.pdf [hereinafter 
CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY] (“The most recent data show that 9% of 
[Minneapolis/Saint Paul’s] total population currently lives in a [Racially-
Concentrated Area of Poverty] tract—up from 3% in 1990.”); see also Alana 
Semuels, Segregation in Paradise?, THE ATLANTIC (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/twin-cities-segregation 
/490970/ (discussing school and community segregation in the Twin Cities). 
5.  See infra Figure 4 (“Chart 3”) in Part II.
6.  Statistics are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and 
is available upon request.  
7.  See infra Section III.A.
8.  See infra Section III.B.
9.  See infra Part III.
10.  See infra Part VI.
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suburbs.11 Increasing concern over the availability of affordable 
housing accelerated the growth of the subsidized housing industry 
within the central cities—the PHI.12 The cities themselves 
participated in this process, creating the Family Housing Fund, a 
“quasipublic” intermediary, which produced thousands of housing 
units in Minneapolis and Saint Paul.13 As a result of segregation, 
city schools declined, which gave momentum to a “school choice” 
movement that sought to implement free-market ideas in the 
education system.14 These so-called “education reformers” would 
become the PEC.15 Its policies have increased and preserved the 
growth of educational segregation.16 
The PHI and PEC are both complex networks of affiliated 
organizations and professionals, stretching through the public, 
private, and nonprofit worlds.17 The PHI centers around nonprofit 
housing developers but also includes funding intermediaries, for-
profit tax credit “syndicators,” attorneys, and lobbyists.18 The PEC 
includes well-funded political advocacy groups, consultants, and, of 
course, many charter schools and charter school networks.19 Both 
the PHI and PEC are industries in their own right, employing 
thousands and receiving hundreds of millions of dollars from the 
government and charitable foundations.20 
Unfortunately, the PHI and PEC depend heavily on the 
segregated status quo. The PHI’s network of professional 
connections is densest in the low-income central-city 
neighborhoods where segregation is greatest, and the majority of 
affordable housing is consequently sited in these areas, which offer 
minimal resistance to affordable development.21 The PHI 
11.  See infra Part II.
12.  See infra Part II.
13.  See infra Part II.
14.  See infra Part II.
15.  See infra Part II.
16.  See infra Part II.
17.  See infra Part V.
18.  See infra Part V.
19.  See infra Part V.
20.  See infra Part V.
21.  INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED 
HOUSING 1 (2016), https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/15/8a 
/158a9849bb744b4573b59f51e4f0ab54/IMO-White-Segregated-Subsidized
-Housing-5-18-2016.pdf [hereinafter THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED 
HOUSING]. 
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frequently dominates both politics and the local economy in these 
neighborhoods. The raison d’être of education reform is correcting 
the perceived failings of central-city schools—failures that arise 
from the massive concentration of low-income, nonwhite students 
in these schools.22 Regional school integration is not on the agenda 
of the PEC, and thus such policy initiatives would threaten the 
influx of charitable funding into PEC organizations. 
Pressure from these two political constituencies have led to a 
series of governmental actions and policies that have had the effect 
of creating and perpetuating regional segregation: 
 The abandonment of a Metropolitan Council Housing
Plan, which enforced the legal requirement that all cities
build a “fair share” of moderate- and low-income housing.23
 A revision of the state’s school desegregation rule to allow
intentionally racially segregated schools to persist
indefinitely without penalty.24
 The exemption of charter schools and the open
enrollment system from the school desegregation rule,
undermining local districts’ ability to pursue integrated
education.25
 Consistently increasing affordable housing goals for the
diverse central cities, and the concomitant decrease of the
same goals for affluent, majority-white suburbs.26
 The rise of massive public-private interaction in the
affordable housing industry, such as the Corridors of
Opportunity group, which sought to place nearly half the
region’s new subsidized housing—4500 units—in
segregated areas along the Cities’ newest light rail line.27
 The failure to consider the impact of affordable housing
and education policies on older, first-ring suburbs, where
segregation and concentrated poverty are growing
22.  See INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE MINNESOTA SCHOOL CHOICE
PROJECT PART I: SEGREGATION AND PERFORMANCE 17 (2017), https://www.law.umn 
.edu/sites/law.umn.edu/files/imo-mscp-report-part-one-segregation-and
-performance.pdf [hereinafter MINNESOTA SCHOOL CHOICE PROJECT PART I]. 
23.  See infra Part III.
24.  See infra Part III.
25.  See infra Part III.
26.  See infra Part III.
27.  See infra Part III.
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rapidly,28 endangering municipalities’ financial stability 
and, consequently, their ability to provide basic services to 
residents.29 
The combined effect of these policies, and similar actions at 
the local and state level, has been to reverse progress towards 
integration. Severe segregation—where less than one student in ten 
is white—has grown explosively in the region’s school districts, 
afflicting approximately 1% of all area schools in 1995 but more 
than 11% today.30 The concerted effort to achieve integration by 
locating subsidized housing to the suburbs, which started in the 
early 1970s and made substantial gains for the first fifteen years,31 
has stalled completely; as shown in Figure 1, the central cities’ 
relative share of subsidized housing has been increasing for 
decades and is now higher than at any point since the 1960s.32  
28.  See infra Part III.
29.  See infra Part III.
30.  Statistics are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and 
is available upon request. 
31.  Derek Thompson, The Miracle of Minneapolis, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/the-miracle-of
-minneapolis/384975/ (“Minnesota passed a law in 1976 requiring all local 
governments to plan for their fair share of affordable housing. The Twin Cities 
enforced this rule vigorously . . . .”); see also INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, 
REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES TO CUT COSTS AND REDUCE 
SEGREGATION 1 (2014), https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/ee/52 
/ee52be92915228d3a453e5428ea40c07/Subsidized-Housing-in-the-Twin-Cities-1-7 
-14.pdf [hereinafter REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES] (“At one 
time, the Twin Cities implemented one of the most integrative affordable housing 
programs in the nation, but its housing integration program was abandoned in 
1986.”).  
32.  See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 1
(“In recent decades, the central cities have captured a disproportionate share of 
subsidized housing funding.”); see also infra Figure 1 (indicating the increase in 
central cities’ share of subsidized housing since 1980); Section III.A. (discussing 
disproportionate concentration of subsidized housing in central cities). 
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Figure 1. 
Making matters worse, some older suburbs have themselves 
become segregated. Today, only 15% of subsidized housing units 
are in areas where schools are less than 30% nonwhite, the lowest 
figure since the beginning of the regional housing program.33 Lack 
of regional support for desegregation has handicapped pro-
integrative organizations such as the Dakota County Community 
Development Agency. In the words of its director, “The policies are 
what drive the funding, and the policies come from the 
Met[ropolitan] Council board . . . and the Minnesota 
Legislature . . . . [T]hey favor funding priorities that are not as 
prevalent in the suburban area.”34 
In the absence of countervailing pressures in the public and 
private sector, real progress on regional, residential, and 
33.  REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 7
(“[N]early 60 percent of subsidized units are in attendance boundaries for 
majority nonwhite schools, even though those areas have less than a fourth of all 
students in the region.”).  
34. Jessie Van Berkel, Suburbs Feel Shorted on Funds for Affordable Housing, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Oct. 31, 2014, 11:36 PM) (quoting Mark Ulfers, 
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educational integration would be possible. A proactive approach to 
housing integration, in which subsidized housing units are 
distributed evenly across the region and Section 8 rental vouchers 
beneficiaries are distributed in proportion to regional population, 
would shift 9700 additional nonwhite students to schools that are 
currently white or integrated.35 This would account for 80% of the 
student moves necessary to create a fully integrated regional school 
system, obviating the need for busing or other aggressive 
remedies.36 
In order to reduce regional inequality, create a more 
competitive region, and build a better-functioning society, it is 
imperative that the Twin Cities reconsider their approach to 
subsidized housing and education. 
II. WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED?
The Twin Cities are affluent, generous, and progressive.37 
There are dozens of organizations dedicated to serving the poor.38 
Why are racial disparities in the Cities as great as or greater than 
racial disparities in any part of the nation?39 Why are our schools 
and neighborhoods much more segregated than regions with 
similar racial and economic characteristics like Seattle and 
Portland? It is becoming clear that many of the efforts originally 
intended to address poverty today actually contribute to severe and 
growing racial and social isolation in schools and neighborhoods, 
35.  See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in Part VI.
36.  See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in Part VI.
37.  See generally What the Twin Cities Can Teach Us About Living Well,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2013/11/18/minneapolis-health-happin_n_4213678.html. 
38.  See Our Members, METROPOLITAN CONSORTIUM OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS, 
http://www.mccdmn.org/membership/our-members/ (last visited Mar. 10, 
2017). See generally Cynthia Boyd, Poverty Surging in Twin Cities’ Suburbs, MINNPOST 
(Oct. 27, 2011), https://www.minnpost.com/community-sketchbook/2011/10 
/poverty-surging-twin-cities-suburbs (discussing multiple organizations and 
nonprofits that are committed to bettering the circumstances of individuals in 
poverty). 
39.  See Christopher Magan, Minnesota’s Worsening Racial Disparity: Why it
Matters to Everyone, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Apr. 29, 2016, 1:00 
PM), http://www.twincities.com/2016/04/29/minnesotas-racial-disparities            
-worsening -why-and-why-it-matters/ (“Minnesota has some of the worst racial 
disparities in the nation . . . .”). 
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preserving the segregation that is at the root of racial inequality in 
the United States.40 
Ironically, as affluent suburbs become gradually more willing 
to allow economic and racial integration, a growing privatized 
poverty “industry” has itself become a new bulwark of segregation 
in housing and schools.41 Nonprofit organizations fight for funding 
to spend on low-income housing concentrated in the region’s 
poorest neighborhoods, where there are no jobs and where the 
schools—from which most children fail to even graduate—function 
as pathways to prison.42 Little funding is left for affluent suburbs 
that boast strong schools and job opportunities, and in recent years 
their applications for affordable housing have been turned down 
with surprising frequency.43 
Within the region’s education system, many policies persist 
that encourage or accelerate segregation. Self-styled education 
“reformers” advocate for single-race charter schools, some quite 
brazenly.44 The charter system is dominated by segregated, low-
performing institutions that only offer dead ends for many 
students.45 By serving specific racial groups, charters deepen 
segregation and undermine the efforts of public schools, which 
have been financially weakened and are becoming more 
segregated.46 Other policies—like the placement of schools47—
40.  See Myron Orfield et al., Taking a Holistic View of Housing Policy, 26 HOUS. 
POL’Y DEBATE 284, 286 (2016) (stating that housing vouchers have historically 
been used in extremely concentrated areas, leading to the segregation of nearby 
schools). 
41.  See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 13–15. 
42.  See id. at 1–3 (showing that a school’s rate of poverty shares a positive
correlation to low student success rates). See generally Raj Chetty & Nathaniel 
Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility I: Childhood 
Exposure Effects (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23001, 2016), 
http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/assets/documents/movers_paper1.pdf. 
43.  See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note
31, at 1, 5. 
44.  See INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, FAILED PROMISES: ASSESSING CHARTER 
SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES 1, 38–39 (2008), http://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads 
/5f/ca/5fcac972c2598a7a50423850eed0f6b4/8-Failed-Promises-Assessing-Charter 
-Schools-in-the-Twin-Cities.pdf [hereinafter FAILED PROMISES]; see also MINNESOTA 
SCHOOL CHOICE PROJECT PART I, supra note 22, at 17.  
45.  See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 40; see also MINNESOTA SCHOOL 
CHOICE PROJECT PART I, supra note 22, at 17. 
46.  See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 40–43.
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create durable avenues for white flight and facilitate the divestment 
of resources from the region’s neediest school districts.48 Despite 
evidence to the contrary, local education policymakers, charter 
boosters, and reformers continue to argue that gaps can be closed 
without addressing segregation and even assert that segregated 
schools are more effective than integrated ones.49 
It is clear that this generous, progressive region must again 
work to become less segregated. Minnesota was once a national 
leader on civil rights, and the state has many laws and policies that 
could, if used, create more integration and less racial disparity.50 
While resistance to integration in affluent communities remains 
strong, it is declining.51 When affluent communities and schools 
attempt greater integration, poverty advocates should help them, 
not undermine their efforts. 
In the past, the Twin Cities’ reputation for progressive civil 
rights activism was well deserved. Minneapolis was the first large 
city in the country to enact a fair housing ordinance, and 
Minnesota was one of the first states to pass a civil rights law 
outlawing housing discrimination. Support for civil rights from 
prominent politicians and governmental bodies was strong: 
47.  See id. at 37 (arguing that highly integrated public schools spur white
enrollment to charter schools in close proximity). 
48.  See id. at 43 (discussing how poor urban school districts divert already-
scarce funding toward marketing budgets to compete for enrollment with nearby 
charter schools). 
49.  See id. at 49 (noting that, instead of actually integrating the schools,
school districts have “racial contact” programs, i.e., multicultural day, but that 
these measures have had little to no effect on integration); see also Beena 
Raghavendran & MaryJo Webster, Desegregation Lawsuit Pulls in State’s Charter 
Schools, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Nov. 30, 2015, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.startribune.com/desegregation-lawsuit-pulls-in-state-s-charter-schools 
/358457791/.  
50.  See, e.g., Christopher Magan, Judge Rejects Minnesota’s School Integration
Plans, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Mar. 22, 2016, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.twincities.com/2016/03/22/judge-rejects-minnesotas-school
-integration-plans/ (describing a now defunct integration scheme enacted in 
Minnesota in the 1990s). 
51.  See, e.g., KIM BRIDGES, THE CENTURY FOUND., EDEN PRAIRIE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS: ADAPTING TO DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE SUBURBS (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/eden-prairie-public-schools/ (describing the 
history of resistance to integration in the suburb of Eden Prairie, as well as its 
recent decline). 
9
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Not only did Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale hail 
from the Twin Cities, but so did Roy Wilkins, Clarence 
Mitchell, and Whitney Young. Republican governor Elmer 
Anderson pushed the Human Rights Act through the 
legislature and Congressman Al Quie helped build a 
Republican consensus to support the major civil rights 
acts of the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the state created 
a regional government, the Metropolitan Council [“Met 
Council”], and enacted a fair-share requirement in the 
Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act that required that 
all suburban communities provide their fair share of 
affordable housing. The Met Council worked with the 
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency to adopt the nation’s 
best regional fair housing program.52 
The Met Council explicitly sought to improve housing choice by 
opening up all of the region’s communities to low-income 
residents,53 and in the ten years prior to 1980, the percentage of 
regional cities offering subsidized housing increased from 8% to 
51%.54
Also in the early 1970s, Minneapolis integrated its public 
schools pursuant to court order, and the state government used the 
momentum created by this lawsuit to adopt a desegregation rule 
that required racially integrated schools throughout Minnesota.55 
This rule aggressively reduced existing segregation and contained 
mechanisms to prevent integrated schools from slowly transitioning 
back into racial isolation. 
As a result of all of these efforts in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
the Twin Cities was on a path to become one of the most integrated 
metropolitan areas in the United States.56 It had all the tools in 
place to do so, and they were working as planned.57 As shown in 
52.  INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, APPENDIX I: IMO MEMORANDUM PROVIDED 
TO HOUSINGLINK REGARDING AI REQUIREMENTS 3 (Oct. 10 2014),
https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/87/2b/872b706a4820ba6fe45aa279a8a1eaab
/IMO-Comments-on-FHIC-AI-Appendices.pdf [hereinafter IMO MEMORANDUM].  
53.  See id.
54.  Alana Semuels, Segregation Holds On in the Twin Cities, CITYLAB (Jul. 13,
2016), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/07/segregation-in-the-twin-cities 
/491162/; see also CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 5. 
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Figure 2 (“Chart 1”), in the early 1990s, only about 2000 (or 2.5%) 
of the region’s nonwhite students were in schools that were more 
than 90% nonwhite,58 and only 3% of the region’s population lived 
in majority nonwhite, high-poverty areas.59  
Figure 2. 
Likewise, black residents living in census tracts that were more than 
50% minority decreased from 45% in 1970 to 38% in 1980.60 On 
the other hand, by the 1980s and 1990s, the region saw increasing 
shares of American Indians, Asians, and Hispanics in majority 
minority tracts, and by the 1990s, there was a reversal of the long-
term decrease in black shares in those tracts.61 
58. School data is for the eleven Minnesota counties in the Twin Cities metro
area in 1995 and is from the Minnesota Department of Education. See Data Reports 
and Analytics, MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://w20.education.state.mn.us 
/MDEAnalytics/Data.jsp (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
59.  CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 5 (1990 data).
60.  See Figure 2 (“Chart 1”). A color version of this graph is available on the
Mitchell Hamline Law Review issue archive at 
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/. 
61. Black shares in majority minority census tracts were calculated from IMO
data provided by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota, 
which manages the National Historical Geographic Information System. See 
11
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By 2010, the number of schools made up of more than 90% 
nonwhite students had increased more than sevenfold (from eleven 
to eighty-three); the number of nonwhite students in those highly 
segregated environments had risen by more than ten times (from 
2000 to 25,400)—a percentage increase from 2.5% to 16%; and the 
share of the regional population in majority nonwhite, high-poverty 
areas rose by three times to 9%.62 
Some of these changes simply reflect the fact that the region 
became more racially diverse during the period. However, other 
metro areas of roughly the same size and with similar demographic 
histories have not shown the same pattern of deterioration in racial 
segregation. For instance, as shown in Figure 3 (“Chart 2”), the 
number of schools in the Portland metro made up of more than 
90% nonwhite students was just two in 2009 (up from zero in 2000) 
and in Seattle it was only twenty-five (up from fourteen).63 The 
neighborhood comparisons are no better, as shown in Figure 4 
(“Chart 3”). In 2012, 19% of low-income black residents of the 
Twin Cities lived in high-poverty census tracts (up from 13% in 
2000) compared to just 3.4% of low-income black residents in 
Seattle (down from 3.5% in 2000) and 1.6% in Portland (down 
from 1.9% in 2000).64 
National Historical Geographic Information System, UNIV. OF MINN.,
https://data2.nhgis.org/main (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).  
62.  CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 5.
63.  Surveys & Programs, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016). The equivalent numbers 
for the Twin Cities from this source were 112 schools with more than 90% 
nonwhite students in 2009 compared to 37 such schools in 2000. Id. See also infra 
Figure 3 (“Chart 2”) in this Part. 
64.  See infra Figure 4 (“Chart 3”) in this Part. PAUL JARGOWSKY, CTR. FOR
URBAN RESEARCH & EDUC., RUTGERS UNIV., COMPILATION OF BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 
DATA (on file with author). Similar differences for Hispanic residents exist across 
the metros. Id. 
12
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In the Twin Cities, as elsewhere in the nation, racial isolation 
and economic decline are intertwined. As the following maps 
demonstrate, the growth of poverty since 1980 has mirrored 
patterns of segregation.65  
65. Maps 1 and 2 were created by IMO using data from the Minnesota
Population Center. See National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0., 
UNIV. OF MINN. (2011), http://www.nhgis.org. Maps 3 and 4 were created by IMO 
using data from the United States Census Bureau. Larger versions of these maps 
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While affluent, white enclaves in the south and southwest of the 
central cities have remained stable, poverty has dramatically 
worsened in much of Minneapolis and Saint Paul, as well as many 
of the older, first-ring suburbs.66 In this way, segregation has helped 
66.  See Steve Berg, Policies that Built First-Ring Suburbs in 1950s Now Foster Their
Decline, MINNPOST (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.minnpost.com/cityscape/2011/04 
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wrench apart the economic fabric of the region, as neighborhoods 
or even entire cities have found themselves crippled by the rapid, 
destabilizing increase in poverty.67 
In this environment, even programs designed to increase 
housing choice can backfire and accelerate segregation. For 
instance, the Section 8 Housing Voucher program is intended to 
provide families with flexibility in the private housing market and, 
in doing so, help prevent the concentration of poverty that is 
associated with public housing.68 Instead, in the Twin Cities, 
Section 8 has replicated the ill effects of public housing. The Twin 
Cities contain a number of dense “clusters” of Section 8 voucher 
holders, concentrating poverty to a remarkable degree.69 A small 
census tract in Minneapolis’s Phillips community concentrates 
voucher holders at the rate of 802 per square mile. In another tract 
in the Aurora-Saint Anthony neighborhood in Saint Paul, with 583 
voucher holders per square mile, 19% of households are using a 
voucher.70 Of the 705 census tracts in the Twin Cities metropolitan 
area, only twenty-one have household voucher use rates above 
10%—eight in Saint Paul, and twelve in Minneapolis.71 By 
comparison, a vast number of census tracts—even densely 
populated census tracts—contain virtually no Section 8 voucher 
beneficiaries. Within the metropolitan area, 37.4% of households 
live in census tracts where five or fewer Section 8 vouchers have 
been put to use; 11.3% live in tracts without a single voucher 
whatsoever.72 
Segregation and the concentration of poverty are no longer 
confined to the central cities. These problems have spilled over 
/policies-built-first-ring-suburbs-1950s-now-foster-their-decline. 
67.  See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 3 (1997) (citing 1990 Summary Tape File 3A, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (1992), http://www2.census.gov/census_1990/1990STF3.html#3A) (“In 
the 1980s, the Twin Cities became the nation’s fourth fastest ghettoizing region.”). 
68.  Christopher Swope, Section 8 is Broken, NAT’L HOUSING INST.: 
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, Jan.–Feb. 2003, www.nhi.org/online/issues/sf127.html. See 
generally Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher 
_program_section_8 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
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into the region’s older suburbs, particularly the first-ring suburbs in 
close proximity to segregated central-city neighborhoods.73 Many of 
these cities are in the process of rapid, destabilizing racial and 
economic transition, as flight from growing segregation pushes 
middle-class residents into the urban fringe.74 These changes 
frequently start in a city’s schools, where open enrollment, 
alternative schooling options, and other instruments of white flight 
can help “flip” an integrated district into severe segregation in a 
matter of years. For instance, in the fifteen years following 1997, 
the Brooklyn Center school district transitioned from 41% 
nonwhite to 84% nonwhite, and 38% low-income to 82% low-
income.75 School transition often precipitates residential 
segregation.76 In the decade following the 2000 United States 
Census, Brooklyn Center has become rapidly more segregated, with 
the number of white residents declining dramatically, from over 
two-thirds of the population to less than one-half.77 
Not surprisingly, the region now shows some of the widest 
racial disparities in the country. Recent data show alarming gaps 
between whites and nonwhites in income, unemployment, health, 
and education. Poverty rates for black Minnesotans are more than 
four times those for whites;78 household incomes for blacks are less 
73.  See, e.g., CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 23 (contrasting
the sharp decrease in white residents with the drastic increase in the percentage of 
rental properties in Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park between 1990 and 2010). 
74.  See Daniel T. Lichter, et al., Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing
Segregation Within and Between Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs, 80(4) AM. SOC. REV. 
843, 846 (2015) (describing an increase in macro-segregation as whites leave 
increasingly integrated cities and suburbs within large metro areas). 
75.  Percentages were calculated by IMO from data provided by the
Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota, which manages the 
National Historical Geographic Information System. See National Historical 
Geographic Information System: Version 2.0., UNIV. OF MINN. (2011), 
http://www.nhgis.org. 
76.  See generally Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated
Schools, and Segregated Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 
12, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-racial-achievement-gap-segregated 
-schools-and-segregated-neighborhoods-a-constitutional-insult/. 
77.  Races in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (MN) Detailed Stats, CITY-DATA.COM,
http://www.city-data.com/races/races-Brooklyn-Center-Minnesota.html (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
78.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE S1701, POVERTY STATUS IN THE LAST 12 
MONTHS: AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES, 2010–2014, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_1YR/S1701 
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than half of those for whites;79 reading proficiency rates for black 
students are less than half those for whites in most school grades 
and years;80 incarceration rates for blacks are twenty to twenty-five 
times greater than for whites;81 and black unemployment rates are 
two to three times those for whites.82 All of these disparities put the 
region and state near the bottom of national rankings.83 
What has brought us to this pass? How did a state and a region 
once at the forefront of civil rights and integration efforts fall so 
far? The answers lie in a complex web of actions by public, 
/0400000US27 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (showing a 36.5% poverty rate for black 
Minnesotans versus 8.9% poverty rate for white Minnesotans). 
79.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml 
?src=bkmk (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (showing that the median annual income 
for black Minnesotans was $29,873 versus $63,127 for white Minnesotans). 
80.  See Third Grade Reading Proficiency, MINNESOTA: WORLD’S BEST WORKFORCE, 
https://mn.gov/mmb/worlds-best-workforce/key-goals/third-grade-reading.jsp 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (illustrating third grade reading proficiency rates); 
Third Grade Students Achieving Reading Standards by Race: Minnesota, 2006–2016, 
MINNESOTA COMPASS, http://www.mncompass.org/disparities/race#1-9515-d.  
81.  Jeff Severns Guntzel, Aging Inmates, Racial Disproportionality, and Other
Facts About Minnesota Prisons, MINNPOST (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.minnpost 
.com/intelligencer/2010/12/aging-inmates-racial-disproportionality-and-other      
-facts-about-minnesota-prison (“Studies of state prison populations in the 1980s 
and early 1990s found that Minnesota’s black per capita incarceration rates were 
about 20 times higher than white rates—the highest ratio reported for any state. 
Minnesota has done better in more recent studies, but its ratio of black to white 
incarceration rates is still in the top quartile.”). See generally Andy Mannix, 
Minnesota Sends Minorities to Prison at Far Higher Rates than Whites, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota 
-sends-minorities-to-prison-at-far-higher-rates-than-whites/374543811/ (discussing 
racial incarceration disparities in Minnesota). 
82.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE S2301, EMPLOYMENT STATUS: AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES, 2010–2014, http://factfinder.census.gov 
/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Dec. 13, 
2016) (showing that the unemployment rate for black Minnesotans was 16.4% 
versus 5.6% for white Minnesotans); see also Ben Johnson, Blacks Nearly Four Times 
More Likely Than Whites to Be Unemployed in Minnesota, CITYPAGES.COM (Minneapolis-
Saint Paul) (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.citypages.com/news/blacks-nearly-four 
-times-more-likely-than-whites-to-be-unemployed-in-minnesota-6539946. 
83.  See, e.g., JONATHAN M. ROSE, DISPARITY ANALYSIS: A REVIEW OF DISPARITIES 
BETWEEN WHITE MINNESOTANS AND OTHER RACIAL GROUPS 3 (2013), 
https://mn.gov/cmah/assets/COBM%20-%202013%20Research%20Report 
%20on%20Disparities_tcm32-33686.pdf. Various reports are also available at 
http://minnesotabudgetbites.org. 
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nonprofit, and private actors during the last thirty years in a 
number of policy areas, including housing, finance, education, and 
transportation. Due to political and governmental apathy, the well-
meaning, but misdirected, efforts of housing developers and school 
reformers, as well as the proliferation of organizations and groups 
with a firm financial interest in maintaining segregated living 
patterns, our state has slowly reversed its civil rights heritage. 
III. THE ORIGINS OF RESEGREGATION
A. Housing Policy and the Rise of the Poverty Housing Industry (PHI) 
Resegregation began in the early 1980s. Rudy Perpich 
returned to the governor’s office in 1983, alongside a solidly 
Democratic and liberal legislature.84 Largely uninterested in 
metropolitan affairs, Perpich’s initial appointee to chair the Met 
Council was Gerald Isaacs, a banker soon accused of having a 
conflict of interest and forced to resign.85 During Isaacs’s and his 
successor’s troubled tenures, the nation’s most effective fair 
housing program, Policy 13, was gradually dismantled.86 
Policy 13 was reaffirmed in the Met Council’s 1985 Housing 
Policy Plan, which was renamed “Policy 39” in 1977.87 Under this 
policy, the Met Council required communities to end exclusionary 
zoning and assigned each community a “fair share”88 goal.89 The 
84.  Perpich, Sr., Rudolph George “Rudy, R.G.,” MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR., 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/legdb/fulldetail?ID=10522 (last visited Dec. 13, 
2016).  
85.  See WILLIAM C. JOHNSON, GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE TWIN CITIES 
REGION: THE POLITICS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL 42, 50 
(Thomas P. Zeit ed., 1998), http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle 
/11299/2055/1/Johnson_Growth_Management.pdf (discussing Perpich’s 
disinterest relative to his predecessor).  
86.  See METRO. COUNCIL, HOUSING POLICY PLAN 81 (2014), https://
metrocouncil.org/METC/files/e3/e3202e04-5ed7-48a3-81b9-e0e5a9c83b2b.pdf. 
87.  See METRO. COUNCIL, OVERVIEW OF THE COUNCIL’S RESPONSE TO THE FAIR 
HOUSING COMPLAINT FILED WITH HUD 10 (2015), http://www.metrocouncil.org 
/getdoc/43691b3d-ffd3-42d5-a57d-d0667660571e/BusinessItem.aspx [hereinafter 
OVERVIEW OF THE COUNCIL’S RESPONSE]. 
88.  See generally John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A
Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573 (1993). 
89.  See All. for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 911
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“Beginning in the late 1970s, based on that formula, the 
Council calculated affordable housing needs for each community and issued 
guidelines for local governments to follow to create affordable housing 
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state housing-finance agency allocated the state’s housing resources 
so that these communities could actually achieve their goals.90 If the 
suburbs wanted access to state funds for roads, sewers, and parks, 
they had to allow affordable housing to be built.91 The Council at 
the time described the suburban reaction as “one of anger, hostility 
and frustration.”92 Nonetheless, the Met Council’s staff maintained 
that “the review role [was] an invaluable tool for implementing 
policy,” and the body continued to leverage its funding powers to 
encourage integration.93 In their words, “the available evidence 
strongly suggests that minority populations would like a far broader 
opportunity for suburban and rural living than they presently 
have.”94 And for a time, the Council largely succeeded in providing 
those opportunities. 
From 1971 to 1979, the Twin Cities built as much as 73% of all 
new subsidized housing in suburbs, the best record in the nation.95 
At the beginning of this period, 90% of the Twin Cities’ subsidized 
units were located in the two central cities, and only sixteen of the 
region’s 189 municipalities had any subsidized housing at all.96 By 
1979, almost 40% of the total subsidized units were located in the 
opportunities. By the early 1980s, cities began producing housing elements as part 
of their comprehensive plans with designations to meet the targets provided by the 
Council.”). 
90.  See CHOICE, PLACE AND OPPORTUNITY, supra note 4, at 10.
91.  See id.
92.  METRO. COUNCIL, HOUSING OPPORTUNITY IN THE TWIN CITIES AREA: A STAFF 
BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSE 1967–1978, at 3 
(1978) (on file with author). 
93.  Id. at 9.
94.  Id.
95.  METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY IN THE TWIN CITIES 
METROPOLITAN AREA 6 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY] (on 
file with author); see also IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 18–19 (citing Robert 
H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential Controls—The Essential 
Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directions for Land Use 
Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974)) 
(“In direct response to the passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act and the 
promulgation of its siting rules, the first school desegregation lawsuit against the 
state of Minnesota, and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Mount 
Laurel, the Met Council (pursuant to its statutory and constitutional duty to 
achieve a fair share distribution of affordable housing) and the Minnesota 
Housing Finance Agency (now Minnesota Housing) created and operated the 
most effective suburban affordable housing plan with the greatest pro-integrative 
civil rights effect in the nation’s history.” (internal citations omitted)).  
96.  See 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY, supra note 95, at 6.
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suburbs, and low-income families had subsidized options in ninety-
seven different communities.97 Slowly but surely, central-city 
housing segregation was being erased.98 
But this would ultimately prove the high-water mark for 
regional integration. The suburban share of affordable housing, 
which increased from 10% to 40% in just a decade, has remained 
almost unchanged to the present day, even as the regional 
population shifted more and more into the suburbs.99 In more than 
thirty years, the central cities’ share of regional subsidized housing 
has never dipped below 57%.100 In other words, by the 1980s, the 
forces that would block further progress had begun to coalesce in 
earnest. 
During the 1970s, the Met Council chair, Al Hofstede—at the 
time, a former Minneapolis Alderman and the city’s future 
mayor—had been forced to fight a constant rearguard action to 
keep affordable housing subsidies in the suburbs.101 He pushed 
state and local governments to avoid concentrating housing 
subsidies in the two central cities and to deploy these resources in 
the suburbs to create a more racially integrated metropolitan 
area.102 But directing affordable housing towards the suburbs 
inevitably kept these resources out of the central cities.103 This 
97.  Id.
98.  See id.
99.  EDWARD G. GOETZ, KAREN CHAPPLE & BARBARA LUKERMANN, THE
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LEGACY OF THE 1976 LAND USE PLANNING ACT (Jan. 2002), 
https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/1960. 
 100.  Statistics are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan 
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and 
is available upon request. See also REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE
TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 3; see also Will Stancil, Affordable Housing Is an 
Industry, Too, STREETS.MN (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://streets.mn/2015/10/08/affordable-housing-is-an-industry-too/. 
 101.  See IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 18–19. 
 102.  Id. at 20 (citing METRO. COUNCIL, DISCUSSION STATEMENT ON
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY 39 (Oct. 1973)).  
 103.  Id. at 29 (citing BERKELEY PLANNING ASSOCS., ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF 
THE HOUSING OPPORTUNITY PLAN (AHOP) FINAL REPORT: VOLUME II, CASE STUDY
NARRATIVES (1979) (prepared for the Office of Community Planning and Housing 
Development, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under 
Contract H-4308 at III-17)) (“Before 1975, seventy percent of subsidized family 
housing was built in the central cities. By 1976, almost sixty percent was built in 
the suburbs and by the end of the decade virtually all of family subsidized housing 
was being built in the suburbs.”). 
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generated resistance from central-city housing agencies and the 
urban developers who could expect to build new affordable 
projects.104 
In what would prove to be a significant setback for suburban 
integration, the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul collaborated 
to create the Family Housing Fund (the Fund) in 1980.105 This 
entity quickly became a useful ally and an effective policy 
instrument for those who believed that public resources should be 
put to use by building affordable housing in low-opportunity 
central-city neighborhoods. With large philanthropic and 
governmental resources, the Fund aggressively promoted the 
construction of subsidized housing in the core cities, effectively 
pushing more government housing funds into the cities’ most  
segregated neighborhoods.106 
In its first decade, the Fund focused on housing in the central 
cities, pumping a reported 10,500 low-income units into 
Minneapolis and Saint Paul.107 The organization eventually grew 
into one of the largest regional players in affordable development, 
and to this day it continues to contribute to projects across the 
metro area.108 But a disproportionate share of its efforts are still 
focused on the two central cities, and as shown in Figure 5 (“Table 
1”), a disproportionate share of the units it helps finance are 
located within segregated census tracts.109 
 104.  Id. at 32 (“When the [LIHTC] program began, central cities housing 
officials, angry at the loss of low income housing funds to the suburbs during the 
1970s, petitioned the legislature to create central city sub-allocators for LIHTC 
funds.”). 
 105.  See FAMILY HOUS. FUND, FAMILY HOUSING FUND ANNUAL REPORT: 2012 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FINANCIALS 3 (Dec. 2013), www.fhfund.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2014/10/2012_Annual.pdf. 
 106.  See generally Robert Franklin, $8.5 Million Grant Goes Toward Housing for 
3,400 Families, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Apr. 26, 1998, 1988 WLNR 
1643322; Ingrid Sundstrom, Financial Transaction Nets Housing Agencies $4.2 Million, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), May 30, 1986, 1986 WLNR 1120819.  
 107.  Robert Franklin, Housing Fund Turns to Suburbs: $7 Million McKnight Grant 
to Help Provide More Living Units, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Feb. 26, 
1991, 1991 WLNR 3707058. 
 108.  See generally History, FAM. HOUSING FUND, http://www.fhfund.org/history/ 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 109.  See Figure 5 (“Table 1”). 
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Figure 5. 
And these figures, which only examine housing projects that 
the Fund directly finances, underestimate the organization’s 
regional influence. The Fund intertwines itself with the Twin Cities’ 
housing policy apparatus: its directors sit on the boards of a 
number of regional projects and collaborations, and the 
organization works closely with virtually every other major public, 
private, and nonprofit entity in affordable housing construction 
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and finance.110 Although the organization is today most frequently 
described as a nonprofit,111 its public sector roots ensure that it 
maintains unusually close ties with local governmental entities. For 
example, its president of thirty-five years is a former deputy director 
of the Minneapolis housing agency—Minneapolis Housing and 
Redevelopment Authority.112 The Fund has also created subsidiaries 
to participate more directly in housing development. These include 
the Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation113 and, more 
recently, the Twin Cities Community Land Bank (The Land 
Bank).114 The Land Bank, itself an increasingly important 
participant in the housing scene, works with private banks to 
acquire foreclosed properties for conversion into affordable 
housing, mostly in distressed Minneapolis neighborhoods, 
particularly in North Minneapolis.115 
The Met Council began to back away from the fair share 
commitments of the Land Use Planning Act and Policy as a result 
of pressure from two sides. On one, there were conservative 
suburban politicians who characterized integration as social 
engineering; on the other, there was an increasingly organized 
housing community, clustered around powerful proponents of 
 110.  See Staff and Board, FAM. HOUSING FUND, http://www.fhfund.org/staff        
-board/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (indicating the wide variety of companies and 
organizations with which staff and board members are involved). 
 111.  FAM. HOUSING FUND, http://www.fhfund.org/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) 
(“The Family Housing Fund is a nonprofit intermediary organization . . . .”). 
 112.  See Frederick Melo, A Number of Long-Serving Nonprofit, Government Officials 
Set to Retire, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (June 27, 2015), 
http://www.twincities.com/2015/06/27/a-number-of-long-serving-nonprofit          
-government-officials-set-to-retire/ (noting that Fulton had served as president 
since 1980 and had previously worked with other housing agencies). 
 113.  The Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation was described upon 
its creation in 1986 as “quasipublic” by the Star Tribune. Ingrid Sundstrom, Family 
Housing Fund Now Developing Rental Units, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), 
Mar. 1, 1986, 1986 WLNR 1127165. However, today it bills itself on its website only 
as a “nonprofit developer.” About, TWIN CITIES HOUSING DEV. CORP., 
http://www.tchdc.org/about (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 114.  About Us, TWIN CITIES COMMUNITY LAND BANK, 
http://www.tcclandbank.org/about.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (noting that 
the organization started its work in 2009). 
 115.  The Land Bank provides maps of its projects. See Resources, TWIN CITIES 
COMMUNITY LAND BANK, http://www.tcclandbank.org/maps.html (last visited Dec. 
13, 2016). 
26
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/1
  
2017] WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED? 27 
inner-city development like the Family Housing Fund.116 Housing 
dollars returned to segregated neighborhoods.117 Much of the land 
that had once been zoned to be inclusionary and multifamily in the 
suburbs quietly reverted to large-lot, single-family home zoning.118 
In the end, the very effective fair share program was ended not only 
by racially motivated white opposition from affluent suburbs, but 
also by the changing priorities and self-interest of central-city 
politicians and housing developers and the neglect of a disengaged 
Met Council and liberal legislature.119 
The advent of a new federal program, the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), also helped accelerate resegregation 
of the Twin Cities.120 Prior to 1986, federally supported housing 
programs, known as HUD (United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development) programs, were closely regulated by civil 
rights rules and pro-integrative court decisions.121 In 1986, HUD 
programs were replaced by tax credits, which were administered by 
the United States Department of the Treasury and subject to fewer 
civil rights rules.122 This loosening of federal oversight gave the 
central-city housing developers another opportunity to capture a 
greater share of affordable development.123 
As Minnesota enabling legislation was created in 1986 to 
administer LIHTC, the distribution system was designed to ensure 
that a disproportionate share of these credits would be dedicated to 
the central cities, effectively returning government-supported 
 116.  See generally Edward Goetz, Karen Chapple & Barbara Lukermann, 
Enabling Exclusion: The Retreat from Regional Fair Share Housing in the Implementation 
of the Minnesota Land Use Planning Act, 22 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 213, 217–18 (2003). 
 117.  See id. at 213–14. 
 118.  Id. at 223–24.  
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See Meredith Rieth, Segregation Under the Guise of the Fair Housing Act: 
Affirmatively Furthering Segregative (and Expensive) Housing Development, 33 LAW & 
INEQ. 285, 300 (2015). 
 121.  See generally NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., A BRIEF HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW OF AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING (2015) (discussing the historical 
involvement of the HUD and other federal programs in providing housing). 
 122.  See id. at 7; see also Data Sets, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV, 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) 
(“Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC program gives state and 
local LIHTC-allocating agencies the equivalent of nearly $8 billion in annual 
budget authority to issue tax credits for the acquisition, rehabilitation, or new 
construction of rental housing targeted to lower-income households.”). 
 123.  NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 121, at 7. 
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housing to segregated neighborhoods.124 Minneapolis and Saint 
Paul both became “sub-allocators,” and the Met Council (with 
input from the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency) was 
empowered to set the cities’ minimum allotment of tax credits.125 
The Met Council chose to award the cities each a share that was far 
in excess of their shares of regional population.126 Even beyond 
that, credits were awarded by a competitive point system that relied 
on calculated criteria.127 Accordingly, these criteria ensured that the 
cities always received an even greater share than their guaranteed 
minimum.128 In addition, these criteria frequently disadvantaged 
proposals for projects in mostly white, growing city neighborhoods 
or suburbs.129 
LIHTC is also been notable for drawing another group of well-
funded interests into the affordable housing world: for-profit 
investors and intermediaries.130 In order to utilize tax credits, 
housing managers and developers form single-purpose 
partnerships with for-profit investors.131 The investors buy their way 
into the partnership for the price of the tax credits, which are then 
deducted from the investors’ annual tax bills.132 The entire process, 
called syndication,133 is facilitated by specialized attorneys and 
financial professionals.134 The investors and syndicators have a 
strong interest in preserving the LIHTC system but no economic 
 124.  See Rieth, supra note 120, at 285, 300–03. 
 125.  REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, 
at 2. 
 126.  Id. at 3 (“In 2012, about 25% of the region’s population and housing 
units were located in Minneapolis and Saint Paul. However, more than twice this 
share of the region’s subsidized housing was located there—59 percent of all 
subsidized units and 53 percent of LIHTC units.”). 
 127.  Id. at 20–24 (explaining the process through which points are allocated). 
 128.  Id. at 20–21 (“State law currently guarantees that Minneapolis and St. 
Paul each receive a share of tax credits significantly greater than their share of the 
region’s population.”). 
 129.  Id. at 23–26. 
 130.  See id. at 20. 
 131.  See generally id. at 22–23. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at 24–25. 
 134.  See id. at 25 (“[S]yndication drags a number of third parties into the 
affordable housing market . . . . These include not only the private investors, but 
specialized coordinators, or syndicators.”). 
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interest whatsoever in pursuing genuine integrative affordable 
housing goals.135 
Growing (and largely white) suburbs were always resistant to 
building affordable housing,136 and when the central cities began to 
recapture federal funding through LIHTC and other means,137 
suburban governments did not oppose their efforts. Nor was there 
significant opposition at the state level. The Met Council, the 
regional entity with the most power to ensure that housing 
subsidies were put towards integrative ends, instead took an easier, 
more politically palatable path and directed money into urban 
communities where affordable development would meet no 
opposition.138 
During the 1980s and 1990s, community development 
organizations became more influential and more deeply 
entrenched in metropolitan politics.139 The collaborative funding 
structure of the tax credit gave rise to dozens of neighborhood-
based low-income development organizations that actively sought 
to build housing in the areas they represented; those areas were 
almost invariably depressed central-city communities.140 Because 
voter turnout and political participation were low in these 
neighborhoods, and there were few commercial or other interests 
with the resources to compete politically, community developers 
 135.  See id. (“[Syndicators] may have objectives that are at odds with the 
housing objectives of the tax credit grant.”). 
 136.  See OVERVIEW OF THE COUNCIL’S RESPONSE, supra note 87, at 10.  
 137.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 
31, at 1 (“[P]otential projects in higher-opportunity suburban areas have gone 
unfunded.”); see also id. at 3 (“Subsidized housing in the Twin Cities is highly 
concentrated in the region’s two central cities. In 2012, about 25 percent of the 
region’s population and housing units were located in Minneapolis and Saint 
Paul. However, more than twice this share of the region’s subsidized housing was 
located there—59 percent of all subsidized units and 53 percent of LIHTC 
units.”). 
 139.  See, e.g., METRO. CONSORTIUM OF CMTY. DEVELOPERS, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 
(2014), http://www.mccdmn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014-MCCD-Annual          
-Report -Final.pdf (discussing the formation of the Metropolitan Consortium of 
Community Developers in 1989 and its path to becoming an influential 
organization involved in metropolitan politics). 
 140.  See, e.g., Membership, METROPOLITAN CONSORTIUM OF COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPERS, http://www.mccdmn.org/membership/our-members/ (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2016) (listing various community development organizations in 
Minnesota). 
29
Orfield and Stancil: Why Are the Twin Cities So Segregated?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
  
30 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
could easily build strong political constituencies.141 These 
neighborhood entities in turn built coalitions with banks, which 
were required under the Community Reinvestment Act to show 
investment activity in segregated neighborhoods.142 It was much 
cheaper and easier for banks to donate or loan a few million dollars 
to neighborhood housing developers than to actively pursue fair 
lending practices. By funding community developers, a bank could 
also generate strong allies who could be counted on to praise the 
bank’s reinvestment policy and who would be unlikely to challenge 
any potentially discriminatory lending.143 
The small neighborhood organizations, headed by and staffed 
with local activists, collaborated closely with larger, wealthier 
developers. The small neighborhood organizations, sometimes with 
nonwhite leadership, were politically attractive and wielded 
outsized influence, so they could effectively appeal for subsidies for 
“their” projects.144 In reality, however, the design and construction 
of these projects were almost always beyond the financial resources 
and technical expertise of the tiny neighborhood group and 
instead were conducted almost entirely by a larger partner—usually 
a well-established nonprofit or for-profit developer.145 
 141.  See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 
31, at 12 (“[W]hile developing in a particular neighborhood may be expensive, a 
community development corporation based in that neighborhood creates a 
political constituency for development activity focused in that neighborhood.”). 
 142.  See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET (2014), https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs 
/publications/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-cra-loans.pdf [hereinafter COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET] (discussing what constitutes “community 
development” for banks seeking to comply with the Community Reinvestment 
Act); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS 7 
(2014), https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/insights 
/insights-low-income-housing-tax-credits.pdf [hereinafter LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDITS] (“An important incentive for banks investing in LIHTCs is the 
[Community Reinvestment Act] consideration they may receive for making these 
investments.”). 
 143.  See LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS, supra note 142, at 9 
(“Participating in LIHTC projects provides banks with opportunities to expand 
existing customer relationships and to develop new customer relationships.”). 
 144.  See generally COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET, supra note 142 
(considering ways in which banks can work with community organizations in order 
to comply with the Community Reinvestment Act). 
 145.  REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, 
at 13 (“[L]arge[r] developers are able to independently conduct most 
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This rising nexus of political and economic forces contributed 
even further to the concentration of affordable housing in the 
central cities.146 With favorable political tailwinds in segregated 
neighborhoods, large firms are less sensitive to costs, leading to 
major projects with ballooning budgets.147 By comparison, because 
opposition to suburban affordable housing is greater,148 developers 
face more resistance in the legal and political spheres, and, in any 
case, proportionately fewer dollars are available.149 Although this 
has resulted in more cost-effective construction in the suburbs, it is 
unsurprising that many developers have little interest in an 
integrative model that offers fewer profits in exchange for harder 
work. 
Affordable development sometimes contributes to a feedback 
loop of segregation, where a concentration of low-income housing 
in a neighborhood accelerates abandonment and disinvestment, 
which in turn attracts yet more attention from community 
developers and makes affordable development even easier to 
pursue.150 For example, in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, 
North Minneapolis, which had for years been a high priority for 
community development, was one of the areas in the state hit 
development, while neighborhood groups are forced to partner with builders, 
architects, financiers, and each other.”). 
 146.  Bloomberg News, Building Affordable Housing Is Hardly Affordable, FIN. AND
COM. (July 26, 2016, 12:28 PM), http://finance-commerce.com 
/2016/07/building-affordable-housing-is-hardly-affordable/. 
 147.  See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 
31, at 13 (“In terms of raw spending and revenue, the activities of the large 
members far outstrip those of the smaller members.”); see also id. at 32 tbl.A.1 
(showing determinants of per unit cost of affordable housing projects). 
 148.  See generally Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (upholding the feasibility of bringing a 
disparate-impact claim in a dispute where a community-based non-profit 
challenged “where housing for low-income persons should be constructed in 
Dallas, Texas—that is, whether the housing should be built in the inner city or in 
the suburbs”); Michael Hoban, Many Suburbs Dodging Issue of Affordable Housing, 
URBANLAND (May 31, 2016), http://urbanland.uli.org/development-business 
/many-u-s-suburbs-dodging-issue-affordable-housing-construction/. 
 149.  Christina Hoag, Low-Income Housing Funds Are Drying Up All Over America, 
TAKE PART (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/01/13       
/low-income-housing. 
 150.  Frederick Melo, U Professor Takes a Contrary View on Affordable Housing 
Development, PIONEER PRESS (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Feb. 23, 2014), 
http://www.twincities.com/2014/02/23/u-professor-takes-a-contrary-view-on         
-affordable-housing-development/. 
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hardest by the foreclosure crisis.151 Ironically, the area has become 
the epicenter of several major local affordable projects and 
initiatives, as foreclosed properties in distressed neighborhoods are 
cheap to acquire, and banks have proven more than willing to turn 
them over to developers and land banks at a discount.152 At times, 
developers in these areas seem to have taken it upon themselves to 
convert every abandoned structure into new, permanent low-
income housing. While this continual evolution of the housing 
stock keeps developers and financial professionals busy, it 
manifestly does not offer residents of distressed neighborhoods 
new housing opportunities in more affluent areas, promote racial 
integration, or promote economic integration. 
Together, the entities involved in affordable development 
form a web of tightly interconnected government agencies, 
nonprofits, private developers, banks, and investors, which are all 
dependent upon a profitable model of building low-income 
housing in poor central-city neighborhoods. This collection of 
interests has coalesced into a dominant force in affordable housing 
in the Twin Cities. Collectively they are hereafter referred to as the 
poverty housing industry, or PHI. 
B. The Creation of the Poverty Education Complex (PEC) 
The rise of the PHI in the early 1990s was accompanied by a 
parallel movement in education policy. As Twin Cities 
neighborhoods resegregated, so did the schools. This triggered a 
decline in test scores, which was used by self-styled “school 
reformers” as evidence of the failure of central-city public 
education. School reformers argued that Minnesotans needed 
more “choice” in education: both the ability to choose which public 
school district to attend and also the option to choose between 
 151. See, e.g., ANDRIANA ABORIETES & ROSE CARR, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS, WEATHERING THE STORM: COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS IN MINNESOTA FACE 
THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2009), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications 
/community-dividend/weathering-the-storm-community-developers-in-minnesota  
-face-the-foreclosure-crisis (“In the hardest-hit parts of the two cities—North 
Minneapolis and St. Paul’s East Side neighborhoods—foreclosures are dismantling 
neighborhood revitalization efforts . . . .”). 
 152.  See, e.g., Jessica Mador, Saving Foreclosed Homes in North Minneapolis, MPR
NEWS (Dec. 7, 2009), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/12/07/reclaiming     
-foreclosed-homes-in-north-minneapolis. 
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traditional public and independent charter schools.153 They 
asserted that charter schools and choice would create a competitive 
race to the top and greater racial integration.154 Similar to what 
happened in the affordable housing sector, a lucrative private 
education sector quickly established itself, consisting of advocacy 
groups, charter research organizations, charter schools, and 
charter support companies. This network of organizations is 
hereafter collectively referred to as the poverty education complex, 
or PEC. 
Enhancing school integration efforts was one of the initial 
arguments made in support of creating open enrollment and 
charter schools, the two primary school choice measures in 
Minnesota.155 However, both programs eventually evolved to share 
many of the same strategies and results that southern 
segregationists used to elude the mandates of Brown v. Board of 
Education.156 Tellingly, charter proponents have completely 
abandoned any effort to defend the programs on the basis of 
integrative outcomes. 
Historically, most charters were predominantly nonwhite, 
poor, and located in the central cities.157 In more recent years, 
 153.  See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 1. 
 154.  See generally JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND
OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION (1996) (providing an overview of the 
charter school movement); TED KOLDERIE, CREATING THE CAPACITY FOR CHANGE: 
HOW AND WHY GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATURES ARE OPENING A NEW-SCHOOLS SECTOR 
IN PUBLIC EDUCATION (2004), http://www.educationevolving.org/pdf/Creating      
-Capacity-for-Change-Summary.pdf (explaining that public education has adapted 
to racial integration). 
 155.  See CITIZEN’S LEAGUE, CHARTERED SCHOOLS = CHOICES FOR EDUCATORS + 
QUALITY FOR ALL STUDENTS, at I (1988), https://citizensleague.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2013/05/424.Report.Chartered-Schools-Choices-for-Education-Quality-
for-All-Students.pdf (“Minneapolis and St. Paul have learned that school 
desegregation based solely on numbers and transportation produces neither 
sufficient integration nor assured access to quality education. We need a new 
approach to multicultural education that values quality as much as it does quotas, 
and that moves us closer to real integration as a community.”). The Citizen’s 
League report was one of the first detailed proposals for charter schools in the 
United States.  
 156.  See 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 157.  Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce, Charters, Choice, and the Constitution, 2014 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377, 389–90 (2014), http://school-diversity.org/pdf 
/13_Orfield.pdf (explaining that the percentage of charters which are 
predominantly nonwhite has been high for most years since the mid-1990s). 
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much of the growth in charter enrollments has been in nearly all-
white schools that appear in suburban areas where the public 
schools are becoming racially diverse—much like segregation 
academies in the Deep South. 
White or nonwhite, charter schools in the Twin Cities remain 
very segregated.158 Nearly 90% of black students at charters attend a 
segregated school, as do about 80% of Hispanic and Asian-
American students.159 Meanwhile, over 70% of white charter 
attendees attend a white-segregated school.160 In most cases, these 
numbers continue to rise. The vast majority of charters, and 
especially nonwhite segregated schools, have produced poor 
student performance, even after controlling for their high poverty 
rates.161 
Charters have been remarkably open about their attempts to 
create single-race enclaves, particularly in the central cities. While 
legally mandated segregation is forbidden, charters have found an 
effective workaround, one that skirts as close as possible to the 
enforced separation of the Jim Crow era—a large number of 
charters are culturally-focused and overwhelmingly composed of a 
single racial group, ensuring that students from any other group 
will remain isolated.162 The strategy has proven highly effective at 
maintaining racial lines, as the degree of segregation at charters is 
much higher than at traditional public schools.163 While even 
segregated traditional schools typically include a small minority of 
diverse students, segregated charters frequently enroll hundreds of 
students from one ethnic group, often without a single 
exception.164 The public school system, forced to compete with 
charters for students and funds, is now slowly following suit, 
dividing diverse student bodies into separate schools, each 
explicitly targeted at a separate racial group.165 
 158.  INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES: 
2013 UPDATE 1 (2013) [hereinafter CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES] (“This 
update . . . shows that charters are still much more likely to be segregated than 
their traditional counterparts.”). 
 159.  Id. at 5–6 
 160.  Id. at 6. 
161.  Id. at 8–10. 
 162.  FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 39. 
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at 39–40. 
165.  Beth Hawkins & Cynthia Boyd, The Rise of Voluntarily Segregated Schools: 
New Trend, Familiar Problems, MINNPOST (Nov. 19, 2008), 
34
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/1
  
2017] WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED? 35 
Similarly, the early years of open enrollment were dominated 
by race-neutral student movements.166 But in recent years, growing 
numbers of white students are using the program to move from 
racially integrated schools (or schools in racial transition) to much 
less racially diverse schools167—a pattern closely resembling 
optional school boundaries, which were outlawed by the Supreme 
Court in the 1970s.168 One key political support for the PEC came 
in the late 1990s, when the Minnesota Attorney General’s office 
sharply changed its interpretation of the meaning of the federal 
equal protection clause. While civil rights stalwart John R. Tunheim 
was Chief Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota, elected state and 
local officials had been told they had broad discretion to integrate 
local schools.169 After Tunheim left to become a federal judge, the 
Attorney General’s office issued an opinion asserting that, without 
proof of discriminatory conduct, the integration plans it had 
previously encouraged were likely to be found illegal, in part 
because they included race-conscious remedies that could be found 
to discriminate against whites.170 The opinion defended segregated 
schools, arguing that “Brown v. Board of Education did not stand for 
the proposition that racially segregated schools, without more, are 
inherently unequal.”171 The new rule, rather than being based in 
any existing law, was instead rooted in the office’s speculative 
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/11/rise-voluntarily-segregated    
-schools-new-trend-familiar-problems. 
 166.  INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, OPEN ENROLLMENT AND RACIAL 
SEGREGATION IN THE TWIN CITIES: 2000–2010, at 7 (2013), 
http://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/30/c7/30c7d1fd89a6b132c81b36b37a79e9e1
/Open-Enrollment-and-Racial-Segregation-Final.pdf (explaining the transition 
from race neutral moves to more integrative or segregative moves). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Milliken 
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971). 
 169.  STATE OF MINN. DEP’T OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES & LEARNING, STATEMENT OF
NEED AND REASONABLENESS, IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO
DESEGREGATION: MINNESOTA RULES CHAPTER 3535 (3535.0100 to 3535.0180) 7 
(1998), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/sonar/sonar-02791.pdf [hereinafter 
FAMILIES & LEARNING] (“The present rule assumes that there should be a certain 
racial balance, and requires districts to propose desegregation plans when that 
balance has been exceeded.”). 
 170.  See id.  
 171.  See id. at 169. 
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assumption that the U.S. Supreme Court would soon declare 
almost all proactive integrative strategies unconstitutional.172 
But charter schools and districts using the open enrollment 
program did not even have to abide by this new, greatly weakened 
integration rule. The new rule exempted charters and open 
enrollment from its requirements, making it nearly impossible for 
local schools to effectively integrate.173 In the case of charters, this 
was achieved by a provision of the law bizarrely declaring that they 
are not considered “schools” for the purpose of the integration 
rule.174 After the effective destruction of the integration rule, school 
segregation skyrocketed,175 which in turn accelerated housing 
segregation and raised the profile of the community developers in 
the PHI. 
Both the PHI and the PEC sought to exploit huge government 
programs in the areas of housing and education to create highly 
salaried administrative positions and private wealth. But unlike 
most powerful corporate interest groups, the PHI and the PEC 
tended to be active supporters of Democratic politicians. In part, 
this is out of necessity: both networks are heavily active within the 
Democratically-controlled central cities. 
As the PHI and PEC grew more influential and the Met 
Council stopped enforcing Policy 39, the region’s heretofore tiny 
black ghetto exploded in size, growing at the fourth fastest rate in 
the nation during the 1980s.176 Meanwhile, Minneapolis’s schools 
went from 34% nonwhite to 59% nonwhite in just twelve years.177 
 172.  Nothing of the sort ever happened; indeed, the Supreme Court has gone 
on to affirm the permissibility of integration efforts like those previously used in 
Minnesota. Id. at 20–21 (“[T]here is a serious question whether the imposition of 
a strict numerical definition of segregation, followed by the use of a race-based 
remedy, such as student assignments based solely on race, or racial quotas at 
schools, would be sustained.”). 
 173.  See generally Margaret C. Hobday, Geneva Finn & Myron Orfield, A Missed 
Opportunity: Minnesota’s Failed Experiment with Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 948 (2009). 
 174.  MINN. R. 3535.0110 subp. 8 (A) (“For purposes of parts 3535.0160 to 
3535.0180 only, school does not mean . . . charter schools under Minnesota 
Statutes, chapter 124E.”). 
175.  Hobday, Finn & Orfield, supra note 173. 
 176.  Paul A. Jargowsky, Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s, 13 J. OF POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 288, 293 (1994). 
 177.  ORFIELD, supra note 67, at 43. 
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IV. RESISTANCE
These regressive trends did not go unnoticed or unopposed. 
Unfortunately, efforts to reverse or slow the process of 
resegregation have thus far all been met with limited success, 
quickly foundering against suburban pushback or, more recently, 
the increasing influence of entrenched housing and education 
interests. 
In 1992, fair housing advocates sued the Met Council and the 
city of Minneapolis over their segregated affordable housing 
policies.178 After several years, the defendants settled in what 
became known as the Hollman Consent Decree,179 using the lawsuit 
as an opportunity to expand suburban affordable housing. Several 
heavily-segregated public housing projects in North Minneapolis 
would be demolished, and replacement units would be constructed 
in the suburbs. Programs to encourage greater racial and economic 
integration were also instituted; for instance, public housing 
residents would also be given special “mobility vouchers” to help 
them find new housing.180 
These efforts were no match for the political, social, and 
economic forces opposing integration. Over two hundred families 
applied for mobility vouchers.181 But 71.9% of these applicants were 
subsequently unable to find a qualifying lease within the time 
frame allowed and thus were prevented from relocating.182 This 
strongly indicated that the unavailability of accessible affordable 
housing was a major culprit in continuing residential segregation. 
But the PHI, rather than regarding this disappointing 
outcome as a symptom of entrenched housing discrimination, 
 178.  See id. at 20; see also EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS, 
UNIV. OF MINN., HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS,
REPORT NO. 1: POLICY CONTEXT AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON HOUSING DISPERSAL 1 
(2002), http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf [hereinafter 
REPORT NO. 1]. 
 179.  See EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN., 
HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS, REPORT NO. 2: 
PLANNING FOR NORTH SIDE REDEVELOPMENT 1 (2002), 
http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf.  
180.  See GOETZ, REPORT NO. 1, supra note 178, at 35. 
 181.  EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN., 
HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS, REPORT NO. 8:
POLICY CONTEXT AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON HOUSING DISPERSAL 35 (2002), 
http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf.  
 182.  Id. 
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instead interpreted it as an indication that fair housing is unviable 
and undesirable. To evaluate the outcome of the lawsuit, the 
Family Housing Fund commissioned a study that characterized 
efforts to provide more suburban housing choices as “dispersal” or 
“deconcentration.”183 The evaluation approached the public debate 
over integration narrowly, focusing heavily on the views of a small 
number of mostly-white housing activists and a local community of 
non-English-speaking Asian immigrants.184 It did not acknowledge 
the political forces, including those within the black community, 
that were continuing to fight to prevent segregation and preserve 
integrated schools. 
The fight for integration was also taking place within the 
legislature. A political coalition of the cities and older suburbs 
urged a return to the Met Council’s Policy 39 and proposed a bill 
that would strongly condition state funding on a city’s willingness 
to provide a fair share of low-income housing.185 But this bill was 
opposed by conservative suburban politicians, some of whom were 
quite explicit about their desire to maintain the suburbs as havens 
for the wealthy.186 The bill passed both houses but was ultimately 
vetoed by Republican governor Arne Carlson.187 
After protracted political battles, a compromise measure 
emerged in its place: a new law that dropped carrot-and-stick tactics 
for an approach that was “all carrot,” so to speak. Suburban 
communities would voluntarily negotiate housing goals with the 
Met Council, and strong housing performance would be rewarded 
with increased funding, which would come from one of several 
 183.  See GOETZ, REPORT NO. 1, supra note 178, at 61. This is the same study that 
demonstrated that most families seeking relocation were unable to find a 
qualifying lease. 
 184.  See EDWARD GOETZ, CTR. FOR URBAN & REG’L AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN., 
HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS: DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS, REPORT NO. 6:
THE EXPERIENCE OF DISPERSED FAMILIES (2002), 
http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Hollman-Compilation.pdf.  
 185.  See H.F. 2171, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1994), https://www.revisor 
.mn.gov/laws/?year=1994&type=0&doctype=Chapter&id=594&format=pdf. 
 186.  Dane Smith, House OKs Penalties for Suburbs Lacking Low-Cost Housing, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Apr. 30, 1993, 1993 WLNR 3952597 (quoting state 
representatives Eileen Tompkins and Todd H. Van Dellen) (“People moved to 
Apple Valley for the good life . . . . We’re not going to sit here and let [the housing 
bill] ruin our community . . . . The suburbs exist for a reason . . . . They give 
people something to shoot for.”). 
 187.  H.R. Journal, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. 8807–08 (Minn. 1994), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/vetoes/1994veto_ch594.pdf. 
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newly created accounts.188 Although this new law did not diminish 
the fair share and civil rights obligations already enshrined in 
Minnesota law, it created little additional pressure for cities to 
integrate, conditioning no preexisting funding on their 
compliance.189 This was called the Livable Communities Act.190 
Simultaneously, pressure for integration was mounting at the 
grassroots level. In 1995, the NAACP sued the state of Minnesota, 
alleging that segregation in Minneapolis had led to 
unconstitutionally inadequate city schools.191 The lawsuit was the 
subject of detailed press coverage. These events coincided with 
crowded, emotional school board meetings in which hundreds of 
black parents from North Minneapolis forcefully opposed the city’s 
effort to return to segregated neighborhood schools.192 Much of the 
testimony centered on the injustice of Minneapolis’s highly 
segregated pattern of neighborhood development and affordable 
housing construction.193 
Suburban school boards, frightened by the prospect of 
mandated busing, proposed a negotiated resolution to the crisis. 
But this proposal collapsed when black community leaders noted 
that school integration without busing would require the creation 
of low-income housing in the wealthy suburbs—something 
suburban communities were unwilling to provide.194 The Orono 
school superintendent, for instance, argued that, “The issue isn’t as 
simple as providing low-cost housing.” He instead suggested that 
the city focus on “creating jobs.”195 As the Star Tribune pointed out 
at the time, the suburbs failed “to put anything concrete on the 
 188.  Kristine Nelson Fuge, Exclusionary Zoning: Keeping People in Their Wrongful 
Places or a Valid Exercise of Local Control?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 148, 163–66 
(1996). 
 189.  See MINN. STAT. § 473.25 (2016) (listing the requirements of the program, 
none of which include conditioning preexisting funding on compliance). 
 190.  Metropolitan Livable Communities Act of 1995, ch. 255, art. 1, § 1, 1995 
Minn. Laws 2592, 2593–600 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 473.25–255 (2016)). 
 191.  See generally Cynthia Boyd & Beth Hawkins, School Integration Through the 
Years, MINNPOST (Nov. 17, 2008),
https://www.minnpost.com/infodoc/2008/11/school-integration-through-years. 
 192.  See generally Jon Hilson, NAACP Sues Minnesota To Defend Desegregation, THE 
MILITANT (Oct. 16, 1995), http://www.themilitant.com/1995/5938/5938_3.html 
(discussing community resistance to desegregated school model).  
 193.  See id. 
 194.  Mike Kaszuba, Suburban Housing Costs Keep Poor Away, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Aug. 4, 1996, 1996 WLNR 5051342. 
 195.  Id. 
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table,” which “[left] them open to criticism that they are motivated 
more by fear of a court ruling than good intentions.”196 
Developments at the regional level were accompanied by a 
major push for more affordable housing within the central cities 
themselves, particularly Minneapolis. Throughout the 1990s, 
housing costs had been a topic of increasing importance in 
Minneapolis politics, as projections showed that within a few years 
even middle-class families would struggle to find affordable 
residences.197 By 1994, this had led to the emergence of a high-
profile grassroots campaign for affordability, which ceaselessly 
lobbied the city government for massive new investments in 
housing. The centerpiece and primary objective of this campaign 
was the creation of a Minneapolis Affordable Housing Trust Fund, 
which would build thousands of affordable units within the city.198 
Initially, the campaign included many civil rights advocates; when 
the City Council finally created a task force to address the issue, it 
placed john powell, a noted civil rights researcher, at its head.199 
But political opposition to integration from state and regional 
government, as well as reluctance by the city to whole-heartedly 
address the affordability issue, created a problem: without 
participation by the Minneapolis suburbs, any attempt to provide 
huge amounts of cheap housing in the city itself would inevitably 
intensify segregation. This question divided housing activists. 
Nonetheless, absent any commitment from the state or Met 
Council to support integration, Minneapolis was incapable of 
resolving the problem on its own. 
Meanwhile, the concerns raised by civil rights advocates did 
little to stop the efforts to construct ever-more affordable housing 
in Minneapolis. In 2001, these efforts culminated in the election of 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See BARBARA J. RONNINGEN, MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., RENTAL 
HOUSING BECOMES MORE AFFORDABLE IN THE 1990S (2003), 
https://www.mn.gov/admin/assets/Rental-housing-becomes-more-affordable-in    
-the-1990s-msdc-sept2003_tcm36-76775.pdf (providing an overview of housing 
costs in the 1990s); Proportion of Households Burdened by Housing Costs, Minnesota, 
MINN. 2020 (Jan. 2013), http://www.mn2020.org/assets/uploads/article/Jan2013 
_housing_graphs.pdf (providing graphs depicting housing costs in the 1990s). 
 198.  See CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS AFFORDABLE HOUSING
TRUST FUND 3 (2013), http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www/groups 
/public/@cped/documents/webcontent/wcms1p-105333.pdf. 
 199.  See Kevin Diaz, Task Force Lays Out Aggressive Plan for Affordable Minneapolis 
Housing, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul), June 24, 1999, 1999 WLNR 6445395. 
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R.T. Rybak as mayor, a close ally of the PHI and PEC. Rybak 
campaigned heavily on the affordable housing issue, calling it his 
“top priority” and promising to erect an enormous “housing 
thermometer” to measure progress towards construction goals in 
front of City Hall.200 Under Rybak, the city finally created the long-
discussed Affordable Housing Trust Fund (AHTF).201 In its first 
decade of operation, the AHTF would pour over $73 million into 
affordable development, resulting in the creation of over 6000 
units in Minneapolis.202 As is the case with nearly all of 
Minneapolis’s affordable units, the vast majority of these are 
located in segregated, distressed neighborhoods.203 
The AHTF replicated in microcosm a simple dynamic that was 
occurring throughout Minneapolis and Saint Paul. Although there 
was considerable political pressure to build affordable units in the 
metropolitan area, and the PHI provided a robust institutional 
framework for doing so, the state and Met Council were refusing to 
ensure that the suburbs received their fair share of housing.204 As a 
result, all of the effort and resources for affordable housing found 
themselves focused in the neighborhoods of least resistance: the 
most racially-isolated, lowest-income regions of the two central 
cities. 
The NAACP’s civil rights efforts ran up against the same 
problem. Its victory in obtaining the 1995 Hollman Consent 
Decree, under which Minneapolis was obligated to raze segregated 
housing projects in North Minneapolis, was reversed when the 
suburbs failed to construct promised replacement units.205 The 
 200.  Steve Brandt, Rybak’s Top Issue, Housing, Gets the Spotlight, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Apr. 7, 2002, 2002 WLNR 12194576. 
 201.  See CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, MINNEAPOLIS APPROVES INCREASED FUNDING
FOR ITS AFFORDABLE HOUSING TRUST FUND (2014), http://housingtrustfundproject 
.org/minneapolis-approves-increased-funding-for-its-affordable-housing-trust          
-fund/. 
 202.  Justin Miller, Minneapolis Renters Face Huge Affordable-Housing Shortage, 
MINNPOST (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy 
/2014/01/minneapolis-renters-face-huge-affordable-housing-shortage. 
 203.  See CMTY. PLANNING & ECON. DEV., CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, CITY OF
MINNEAPOLIS AFFORDABLE HOUSING TRUST FUND 2002–2012, at 7 (2013), 
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@cped/documents 
/webcontent/wcms1p-105333.pdf. 
 204.  See Semuels, supra note 4. 
 205.  See generally Ciara Carolyn Torres, Housing in the Heartland: An 
Examination of the Hollman v. Cisneros Consent Decree, the Politics of Racial 
Concentration and the Possibilities Offered by Democratic Experimentalism, 17 NAT’L 
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intransigence of suburban and regional governments had created 
the unenviable choice between public housing in the cities and no 
public housing at all, and the community split over whether to 
cancel the demolitions it had formerly requested.206 
Jesse Ventura’s Met Council, first appointed in 1998, provided 
a valuable assist in the push to massively increase affordable central-
city housing construction. One of its most important tasks was to 
implement the Livable Communities Act (LCA).207 Though the 
LCA represented a compromise measure, lacking the enforcement 
mechanisms of previous approaches, a number of civil rights 
advocates were still optimistic that it could trigger a transformation 
of the suburbs, reducing segregation in the region. In 2002, the 
law’s sponsor told the Star Tribune it was accomplishing its goals 
and “ha[d] helped change the debate on affordable housing in 
most suburbs from ‘whether’ to ‘how.’”208 
But in a repudiation of the fair housing proponents who 
supported the passage of the act, Ventura’s Met Council used the 
LCA to give the highest affordable housing goals to the deeply 
segregated central cities and low-income, rapidly segregating 
suburbs.209 By 2007, local media was acknowledging that the LCA 
had “fallen far short” of meeting its affordable unit targets, with a 
number of suburban communities producing a tiny fraction of 
their negotiated goals.210 
Ventura’s Met Council had cynically used a law passed to open 
up whiter suburbs for affordable housing to increase the affordable 
housing shares of segregated neighborhoods. This reversal 
effectively undermined the political coalition for metropolitan 
BLACK L.J. 98 (2003) (providing an extensive overview of the history and aftermath 
of the Hollman Consent Decree). 
 206.  Kevin Diaz, MCDA Calls Affordable Housing Report ‘Problematic,’ STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul), Aug. 17, 1999, 1999 WLNR 6451578. 
 207.  Metropolitan Livable Communities Act of 1995, ch. 255, art. 1, § 1, 1995 
Minn. Laws 2592, 2593–600 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 473.25–255 (2016)). 
 208.  Steve Brandt, Affordable Housing: Where Battle Lines—and Solutions—Are 
Being Drawn, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Jan. 20, 2002), 2002 WLNR 
12172593. 
 209.  The Met Council does not maintain a public list of Livable Communities 
Act per-community housing goals. The goals are on file at the Institute of 
Metropolitan Opportunity. 
 210.  Scott Neal, Editorial: Metro Failing to Meet Housing Goals, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (July 17, 2007),
http://edenprairieweblogs.org/scottneal/post/1062/. 
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reform that had existed between the central cities and older 
suburbs during the 1990s. 
Previous Met Councils had used lawsuits as a fulcrum on which 
to leverage significant fair housing and civil rights reforms, like 
desegregating schools and integrating neighborhoods. But when 
Ventura’s Met Council was sued to enforce the fair share 
requirement of the Land Use Planning Act, it reacted with hostility, 
hiring one of the region’s best corporate law firms to defeat the 
under-resourced civil rights advocates.211 
During the next several years, Minneapolis and Saint Paul 
would add more units of subsidized, very low-income housing than 
would be built in all the suburbs combined. Between 2002 and 
2011, the region produced 2249 new, very affordable units 
(affordable to those earning 30% of the metro median income).212 
Ninety-two percent of these units were produced in the central 
cities, which have 23% of the region’s population.213 In other 
words, the central cities received four times their fair share of very 
low-income units. Virtually all of these units were located near 
segregated or re-segregating schools. Of the 7253 new and 
preserved very affordable units from this period, 74% were in the 
central cities—over three times their fair share.214 
Faced with the undeniable failure of the LCA to accomplish its 
original aims, the Met Council, rather than restoring its previous, 
more successful policies, abandoned any pretense of fighting 
segregation. The Met Council’s own documents captured an 
obvious change in priorities. As late as 1996, its Regional Blueprint 
discussed the stalled progress towards suburban housing 
integration, noting with concern that the situation had not 
improved in over a decade.215 But by 2004, even this vestigial 
anxiety over civil rights had vanished.216 That year’s Regional 
Development Framework only noted that “[t]he region will, of 
course, need much more housing in the next 30 years” and 
 211.  All. for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, No. C7-02-007774, 2003 WL 
25485305 (D. Minn. 2003). 
 212.  Data on regional housing production were obtained from resources 
maintained by HousingLink, including its annual reports; the most recent report 
is available at http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Housing_Counts_2002_2013.pdf. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See METRO. COUNCIL, REGIONAL BLUEPRINT 59 (1996). 
 216.  METRO. COUNCIL, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 13 (2004). 
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emphasizes the importance of “public-private partnerships” in 
expanding housing supply.217 
In 2010, the Council negotiated a new set of LCA goals.218 
From a civil rights perspective, the results were disastrous: the 
housing goals for exurban communities dropped by 42%, and the 
goals for predominately white communities dropped by 63%.219 But 
the goals for the two central cities increased by 43%.220 
Rather than acknowledging its own drifting priorities, the 
Council now claims, in a bold rewrite of history, that fair housing 
efforts were scuttled as part of a premeditated policy change. Its 
2014 Housing Policy Plan ambiguously states that “actions in 1998 
and 1999 eliminated [the Policy 39 fair share plan] from the 
metropolitan development guide.”221 But the Council has been 
unable to provide any record of such actions, and, under pressure 
to explain its odd assertion, has finally suggested that this landmark 
fair housing policy was eliminated by implication, after years of 
nonenforcement.222 In other words, the Met Council, once an 
agency deeply concerned with the problem of regional segregation, 
now claims that its most important civil rights tool has simply 
atrophied away due to years of nonuse.223 
Two decades of battles on behalf of integration have painted a 
gloomy picture of life in poor Twin Cities neighborhoods.224 But 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  See Housing Preservation Project, Met Council Establishes Two Sets of 
Housing Goals for Cities Starting in 2011, TCHOUSINGPOLICY.ORG (2011), 
http://www.tchousingpolicy.org/act_locally/index.php?strWebAction=article 
_print&intArticleID=618; see also METRO. COUNCIL, METROSTATS 8 (2011), 
http://www.tchousingpolicy.org/_uls/resources/downloads/2011_2.11 
_AffordableHousing_MS2010.pdf (discussing the “2010 LCA housing goals” and 
the shortfalls in reaching these goals). 
 219.  See METRO. COUNCIL, 2010 LIVABLE COMMUNITIES ACT (LCA) GOALS 
(2010) (on file with author). See generally METRO. COUNCIL, METROSTATS, supra 
note 218 (providing data regarding Affordable Housing Production in the Twin 
Cities Region and looking at planning and goals in central cities, developed 
suburbs, developing suburbs, rural centers, rural areas, and the metro area).  
 220.  Figures generated by comparing the original 1995 goals to the 2010 
goals. See IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 19–20 (graphically illustrating the 
affordable housing goals for the Livable Communities Act between 1996 and 
2010). 
 221.  HOUSING POLICY PLAN, supra note 86, at 18. 
 222.  IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 32. 
 223.  Id. at 32–33. 
 224.  REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 1. 
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the Met Council, it seems, subscribes to a different vision of 
housing disparities—a vision also favored by affordable housing 
developers.225 In this view, the defining problem of housing 
inequality is simply a shortage of units, and low-income minorities 
no more want to live in the suburbs than they are missed by the 
affluent whites already there.226 The solution is simple and never 
changes: more money is needed to build more units, wherever 
space for them can be found. 
This viewpoint, characteristic of the PHI, now dominates 
housing policy, with real consequences for Twin Cities residents. 
The share of affordable housing in higher-income white suburbs 
has declined to the lowest percentage since the 1970s.227 
Meanwhile, unprecedented concentrations of subsidized housing, 
developed at heavy expense, is being targeted for locations near 
transit lines in poor neighborhoods. This land is potentially 
valuable and, if used for commercial or market-rate development, 
could have jumpstarted the recovery of those neighborhoods. Even 
though most unfilled entry-level jobs are now in the suburbs,228 often 
without transit access,229 the PHI continues to assert that affordable 
housing must be close to transit hubs and the central business 
districts, which serve as the region’s largest clusters of highly-skilled 
jobs.230 
Research shows that low-income housing tenants in growing 
suburbs are more likely to be employed at better jobs, with their 
children more likely to be doing better in higher-performing 
schools.231 More than 60% of all nonwhite residents of the Twin 
Cities and 40% of nonwhite residents of subsidized housing live in 
 225.  IMO MEMORANDUM, supra note 52, at 13. 
 226.  See id. 
 227.  Semuels, supra note 54. 
228.  Bruce Katz & Katherine Allen, Help Wanted: Connecting Inner-City Job 
Seekers with Suburban Jobs, 17 BROOKINGS REV. 31, 32 (1999), 
http://www.nsl.ethz.ch/displus/140/docs/bkatz.pdf. 
 229.  See Adie Tomer, Transit Access and Zero-Vehicle Households, METROPOLITAN 
POL’Y PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS 6 (2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/06/0818_transportation_tomer.pdf (stating that transit 
accessibility rates in major cities are nearly double that of suburban areas). 
230.  Katz & Allen, supra note 228, at 33. 
 231.  Brett Theodos, Claudia Coulton & Amos Budde, Getting to Better 
Performing Schools: The Role of Residential Mobility in School Attainment in Low-Income 
Neighborhoods, 16 CITYSCAPE 10 (2014). 
45
Orfield and Stancil: Why Are the Twin Cities So Segregated?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
  
46 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
the suburbs,232 and subsidized housing units in the suburbs have the 
region’s longest waiting lists.233 Nonetheless, the PHI argues that 
low-income racial minorities would prefer to stay in central-city 
neighborhoods, despite those neighborhoods’ existing segregation 
or badly-performing schools, and that subsidized housing must be 
built in these communities to accommodate them.234 
The PHI also argues that concentrating subsidized housing in 
poor neighborhoods will revitalize the housing markets of those 
neighborhoods.235 But there is little evidence of any sustained or 
transformative revitalization during the last three decades of 
building subsidized housing in these neighborhoods.236 Nor is there 
good evidence of long-term economic development benefits of 
concentrating subsidized housing anywhere else in the country.237 
In fact, studies on local subsidized housing projects suggest that 
major projects have no effect at all on neighborhood recovery.238 
For some civil rights advocates, this is a familiar story—
Minnesota is not the only place where development interests have 
succeeded in convincing politicians that affordable housing is 
synonymous with civil rights. But events in other regions also show 
that ignoring segregation can have costs. In 2009, Westchester 
County, a relatively progressive suburb of New York, was sued for its 
failure to remedy racial isolation.239 The county’s federally-
 232.  Statistics are from U.S. Census American Community Survey and 
Housing and Urban Development data compiled by the Institute on Metropolitan 
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and 
is available upon request.  
 233.  See MINN. HOUS. P’SHIP, SURVEY OF APPLICANTS TO THE MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC 
HOUSING AUTHORITY SECTION 8 WAITING LIST 3 (2008), 
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/SIRR-MN-2008-3.pdf. 
 234.  See, e.g., Amanda Kolson Hurley, When Integrating the Suburbs Isn’t Enough, 
CITYLAB.COM (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/02/when     
-integrating-the-suburbs-isnt-enough/462765/ (providing statements from several 
people connected to community developers, including the primary lobbyist in 
Minnesota for PHI).  
 235.  REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 28. 
 236.  Id. at 25. 
 237.  JILL KHADDURI, KIMBERLY BURNETT & DAVID RODDA, TARGETING HOUSING 
PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES: LITERATURE REVIEW 63 (2003), 
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/targetinglitreview.pdf.  
 238.  REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 31, at 26–
30. 
 239.  U.S. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 
(S.D.N.Y 2009). 
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mandated analysis of impediments to fair housing had almost 
completely ignored the issues of race and segregation; the county 
claimed that “the most pressing impediment to fair housing was the 
lack of affordable housing stock” and that it had done “an 
outstanding job in increasing the stock of affordable housing.”240 
The county had indeed added thousands of affordable units,241 
though many of its wealthy municipalities contributed little to this 
effort.242 But, in an ominous decision for the Twin Cities, a federal 
judge decided this was insufficient.243 Pointing out that “fair 
housing” and “affordable housing” are distinct concepts, she 
determined that the county had defrauded the federal government 
when it claimed to have fulfilled its housing-related civil rights 
obligations.244 
V. THE PHI AND PEC TODAY 
The PHI has grown ever more influential, and today it 
functions, in essence, as its own sector of industry. Community 
Development Corporations (“CDCs”) alone account for revenues 
approaching $200 million per year, distributed across dozens of 
organizations with thousands of employees,245 and a dense network 
of financial professionals specializing in affordable-housing 
funding has grown to support these institutions.246 Today, most 
workers in the field of affordable housing come from a financial or 
development background and have little or no connection to 
metropolitan policymaking or civil rights.247 
240.  Id. at 551.  
 241.  See id. at 564–65. 
 242.  See id. at 559. 
 243.  See id. at 564–565. 
 244.  Id. at 554–55.  
 245.  See REFORMING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING POLICY IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 
31, at 26–30. 
 246.  See, e.g., Current NHC Members, NAT’L HOUSING CONF., 
http://www.nhc.org/members (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (listing the largest 
partners of NHC, a national organization for affordable housing, as four large 
financial or investment institutions); Learn More about SHOP Home Mortgage, SHOP 
HOME MORTGAGE, http://www.shop-mortgage.org/about-shop-home-mortgage 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (explaining that SHOP is an organization in the greater 
Twin Cities that partners with financial institutions and other organizations to 
provide home mortgages). 
 247.  See, e.g., Leadership, CORRIDORS OF OPPORTUNITY, 
http://www.corridorsofopportunity.org/partners/leadership (last visited Dec. 13, 
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In the public sector, the affordable housing policy apparatus 
has changed course to accommodate these new participants, with 
their heavily-financialized, entrepreneurial outlook.248 
Consequently, policymakers have minimized the role of integration 
even as a secondary aim of affordable development; for instance, 
the state today awards only 9 out of 246 available priority points for 
LIHTC projects located in an economically integrated 
neighborhood and no points at all for projects in white or racially 
integrated locations.249 
In the early 2000s, Twin Cities nonprofit foundations, which 
heretofore had been strong supporters of integrated schools and 
neighborhoods, also began dramatically increasing funding to 
supporters of central-city housing and charter schools.250 Their 
support for integration and civil rights seemed to diminish.251 
By the time Mark Dayton was elected governor, members of 
the PHI would monopolize appointments to state agencies involved 
in housing and metropolitan development. Susan Haigh, the 
president of low-income housing developer Habitat for Humanity 
and an alumna of the affordable housing community, was 
appointed chair of the Met Council.252 At the head of the 
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency was Mary Tingerthal, a 
financial professional who, according to her official biography, 
“coordinated the work of the Housing Partnership Fund . . . , 
Housing Partnership Ventures, [and] the Charter School 
2016). Although a selection of the leaders on this list work in community focused 
organizations, many work in for-profit or government positions. Id. 
 248.  See Rieth, supra note 120, at 287 (“This program serves not as a means to 
further fair housing, but rather favors expensive placements in segregated areas or 
communities in danger of re-segregating.”). 
 249.  See MINN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, LIHTC SELF-SCORING WORKSHEET (2013), 
http://www.mnhousing.gov/get/MHFA_012461. 
 250.  Trends are from data compiled by the Institute of Metropolitan 
Opportunity, University of Minnesota Law School. Data is on file with author and 
is available upon request. Authors went through grant lists and 990 tax forms to 
determine how much money was going to civil rights, charters, and community 
developers. See Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, I.R.S. (Aug. 
2, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/about-form-990 (“Tax-exempt organizations, 
nonexempt charitable trusts, and section 527 political organizations file [a 990] 
form to provide the IRS with the information required by section 6033.”). 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  See Meet Our Leadership Team, TWIN CITIES HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, 
https://www.tchabitat.org/about/leadership#1 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
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Financing Partnership, a new conduit for charter school 
loans . . . .”253 
The PHI has evolved to keep abreast of new trends in urban 
development, such as increased enthusiasm for transit-oriented 
planning.254 But as a consequence of the industry’s risk-averse, 
technocratic leadership and minimal institutional expertise in civil 
rights, these efforts have almost always resulted in funding being 
directed into segregated urban neighborhoods.255 For example, in 
2007, many of the largest participants in affordable housing 
development teamed up with transit advocates and other regional 
reform groups to create Corridors of Opportunity, which would 
help distribute millions of dollars of new federal and philanthropic 
support.256 Many of these millions ended up funding housing 
projects along the region’s new Green Line light rail, as part of an 
attempt to create 4500 affordable units along the transit corridor.257 
Despite the fact that the Green Line passes through relatively 
affluent areas of both central cities, virtually all of the planned 
affordable units were located in one heavily-impoverished stretch in 
Saint Paul, including one neighborhood which boasts the dubious 
distinction of being the state’s second-poorest census tract.258 
 253.  Governing Board, NAT’L COMMUNITY INV. FUND, 
http://www.ncif.org/connect/about-ncif/ncif-trustees (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 254.  See CORRIDORS OF OPPORTUNITY, HOUSING/TRANSIT-ORIENTED 
DEVELOPMENT LOAN PROGRAM REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS 1 (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://tcclandbank.org/downloads/Corridors-of-Opportunity-RFP.pdf. 
 255.  See, e.g., The Poverty Housing Industry Is a Problem, HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 28, 
2015), http://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/36385-the-poverty       
-housing-industry-is-a-problem (discussing that housing funding must be 
distributed in a more even way, “rather than concentrating such projects in 
distressed, low-income, minority neighborhoods”). 
 256.  CORRIDORS OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 254, at 1 (“[T]he partner lending 
institutions of the [Corridors of Opportunity] Initiative, will lend up to $14.3 
million for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, and preservation of single 
family and multifamily affordable housing . . . and large multifamily housing or 
mixed-use transit oriented developments along . . . [the Green Line].”). 
 257.  TWIN CITIES LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., CENTRAL CORRIDOR 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING COORDINATED PLAN: RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
5 (Jan. 2012), http://www.tclisc.org/PDFs/big_picture.pdf (explaining The Big 
Picture Project’s expanded goal to achieve 4500 affordable housing units between 
2011–2020). 
 258.  See Frogtown/Thomas-Dale Neighborhood, MINN. COMPASS, http:// 
www.mncompass.org/profiles/neighborhoods/st-paul/frogtown-thomas-dale (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
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In some ways, Corridors of Opportunity looks like the PHI in 
microcosm. It is led by a board composed of public officials and 
community organizations from Minneapolis and Saint Paul, 
affordable housing financiers, and a number of charter school 
affiliates.259 Notable members include: the vice president of the 
Family Housing Fund (the “Fund”); the executive director of the 
Twin Cities branch of Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
(LISC), a financial organization which supports affordable housing 
nationwide; the president and CEO of Twin Cities Community 
Land Bank, the Family Housing Fund’s subsidiary; a member of the 
Itasca Project, a group run by the national consulting firm 
McKinsey & Co., which promotes charter schools across the Twin 
Cities region; a president and CEO of a local charter school; the 
executive director of Nexus Community Partners, a community 
development organization focusing almost entirely on the poorest 
neighborhoods in North and South Minneapolis and Eastern Saint 
Paul; and the executive director of the Cornerstone Group, a for-
profit real-estate company.260 Met Council President Susan Haigh, 
formerly of Habitat for Humanity, sits as a co-chair.261 There are no 
board members from civil rights organizations. 
Besides showing the tangle of interests promoting inner-city 
affordable housing, Corridors of Opportunity illustrates another 
feature of the PHI: its tendency to blur the lines between the public 
and private sector. Corridors of Opportunity is theoretically a 
public entity, though it is largely composed of individuals from the 
private and nonprofit sectors. But to spur development along the 
Green Line, it works closely with a private-sector counterpart, the 
Central Corridor Funders Collaborative.262 The Funders 
Collaborative, confusingly, includes many of the same members as 
Corridors of Opportunity, including LISC, the TCC Land Bank, the 
Family Housing Fund, and the Met Council.263 Making matters 
 259.  Leadership, CORRIDORS OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 247. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  See Funders Collaborative and Corridors of Opportunity Recognized in Secretary’s 
Award Presented to the Saint Paul Foundation, CENT. CORRIDOR FUNDERS 
COLLABORATIVE BLOG (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.funderscollaborative.org/blog     
-archive/funders-collaborative-and-corridors-of-opportunity-recognized-in
-secretarys-award-presented-to-the-saint-paul-foundation. 
 263.  See CENT. CORRIDOR FUNDERS COLLABORATIVE, THE BIG PICTURE PROJECT: 
PROGRESS REPORT 2016 (2016), http://www.funderscollaborative.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/04/BigPictureProgressReport2016Finalsingles.compressed.pdf. 
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worse, some of the organizations involved—for instance, the Family 
Housing Fund—have at times been described as “quasipublic” in 
character.264 For outsiders, this labyrinth of collaboration makes it 
next to impossible to monitor the use of public money, to 
safeguard civil rights responsibilities, and to efficiently utilize 
disclosure laws. 
The PEC is somewhat more centralized and interconnected 
than the PHI, with local advocacy organizations relying more than 
housing developers on the charitable contributions of extremely 
wealthy benefactors and major foundations. For instance, in 2014, 
the Bush Foundation awarded $200,000 in “Education Ecosystem” 
grants to nearly a dozen Twin Cities education reform 
organizations.265 “Ecosystem” is an appropriate descriptor, as many 
of the recipients are closely intertwined, sometimes in ways that call 
their independence into question. For example, grant recipient 
Charter School Partners, theoretically an analysis and research 
organization, shared an office with fellow recipient MinnCAN, the 
former Minnesota chapter of national charter advocacy 
organization 50CAN.266 National “grassroots” advocacy groups, such 
The Big Picture Project, a collaborative project aimed at creating affordable 
housing and strengthening public and private investment in low-income 
neighborhoods, is hosted, in part, by Twin Cities LISC and supported by the 
Central Corridor Funders Collaborative. Id. at 8. Big Picture Oversight team 
members include individuals from the Metropolitan Council, Twin Cities LISC, 
and Family Housing Fund. Id. at 2; see also Affordable Housing: Other Investments, 
CENT. CORRIDOR FUNDERS COLLABORATIVE, 
http://www.funderscollaborative.org/affordable-housing/other-investments (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“The Funders Collaborative provided seed funding to the 
Twin Cities Community Land Bank for the purposes of acquiring strategic 
buildings or parcels of land along the Green Line for equitable development 
purposes.”). 
 264.  Taylor Gee, Something Is Rotten in the State of Minnesota, POLITICO (July 16, 
2016) http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/minnesota-race             
-inequality-philando-castile-214053. 
 265.  Minnesota Education Equity Partnership, BUSH FOUND., 
https://www.bushfoundation.org/minnesota-education-equity-partnership (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 266.  See Sarah Lahm, MinnCAN Shifts as Minneapolis School Board Race Gets 
“Animated,” BRIGHT LIGHTS SMALL CITY BLOG (Oct. 1, 2016), 
http://www.brightlightsmallcity.com/minncan-shifts-as-minneapolis-school-board  
-race-gets-animated. Although the groups once shared office space, both 
MinnCAN and Charter School Partners have since disbanded. See id. 
(“[MinnCAN] shared space in southeast Minneapolis with local, but now defunct, 
charter school champions, Charter School Partners.”); Andrea Roethke, Thank 
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as Students for Education Reform and Educators 4 Excellence, 
have been very active in the Twin Cities. The national media has 
frequently accused these two groups of serving as front 
organizations for wealthy donors, using their considerable financial 
resources to recruit thousands of rank-and-file members and 
creating the appearance of organic education advocacy.267 At times, 
PEC organizations have come under scrutiny in local media for 
acting as financial conduits between national financiers and local 
school politics.268 
Beyond these advocacy and support organizations, the PEC 
also includes, of course, hundreds of charter schools themselves. 
While some of these are simply small specialty institutions, such as 
Montessori schools, others are large and powerful regional actors. 
Charter superintendents sometimes earn considerably higher 
salaries than their counterparts in traditional public schools. One 
local charter “entrepreneur” attracted criticism when his personal 
compensation exceeded $270,000; his schools also employed 
several family members, bringing total compensation to more than 
$400,000.269 Other Twin Cities charters are members of national 
charter school networks such as KIPP—schools that have been 
You, MINNCAN BLOG (Sept. 28, 2016), https://minncan.org/blog/thank-you-2 
(announcing that MinnCAN had disbanded).  
 267.  See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, How to Spot a Fake ‘Grassroots’ Education Reform 
Group, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/10/12/how-to     
-spot-a-fake-grassroots-education-reform-group. 
 268.  Alejandra Matos, Out-of-State Money Pouring into Minneapolis School Board 
Race, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.startribune.com/out-of-state-money-pouring-into-minneapolis-school  
-board-race/280863712. 
 269.  Steve Brandt, Mahmoud’s 273K Salary Raises Eyebrows, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis-Saint Paul) (Aug. 15, 2012),
http://www.startribune.com/mahmoud-s-273k-salary-raises-eyebrows/166274586. 
By contrast, charters usually pay their teachers low wages and provide few benefits, 
leading to high turnover. Compare MINN. ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH., MINNESOTA 
CHARTER SCHOOLS ANNUAL COMPENSATION (SALARY & BENEFITS) SURVEY REPORT - 
2008 FINDINGS 1, http://www.mncharterschools.org/_uls/resources 
/2008_Compensation_Summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2017) (listing the 
average salary and benefits package for licensed Minnesota charter school teachers 
as $46,792), with NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, RANKINGS AND ESTIMATES 19 (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/NEA_Rankings_And_Estimates_FINAL 
_20120209.pdf (listing the average base salary for Minnesota public school 
teachers as $53,680). 
52
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/1
  
2017] WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED? 53 
frequently accused of practicing “corporate-style, finance-driven” 
education, roughly analogous to the dominant approach in 
affordable housing construction.270 
In some cases, charter schools have hidden connections to for-
profit companies. For example, Minnesota offers several online 
“virtual” high schools, which are largely based out of rural locales 
such as Fergus Falls or Houston, Minnesota.271 Although ostensibly 
public schools like any other, these online schools pay millions of 
dollars a year to purchase curriculums from for-profit companies 
like K12 Incorporated, which help set up the schools and provide 
ongoing technical and instructional support.272 Elsewhere in the 
nation, online high schools have been heavily criticized for 
providing low-quality education and failing to assist the struggling 
students they often court.273 
Studies of student performance in Twin Cities charter schools 
have established that they underperform traditional public schools 
and have done so for all twenty years of their existence.274 For all 
the attention and publicity they receive, and for all the corporate 
and philanthropic support they muster, charter schools are not 
only more segregated than traditional public schools, but actively 
contribute to greater segregation and weaker educational 
 270.  See Jerusha Conner, Public Schools Are a Public Good, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 16, 
2015, 11:15 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank 
/2015/04/16/charter-schools-threaten-a-cornerstone-of-american-democracy. 
 271.  See, e.g., MINN. VIRTUAL ACAD., http://mnva.k12.com/who-we-are 
/letter2.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (stating that Minnesota Virtual Academy 
is a program of Houston Public Schools). 
 272.  Information about the contractual relationship between the Fergus Falls 
and Houston School Districts and charter support companies was obtained 
through a Minnesota Data Practices Act request. 
 273.  See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, More Pupils Are Learning Online, Fueling Debate on 
Quality, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/education/06online.html (stating that 
online education saves states money but does nothing to reduce the need for 
remedial college courses when students take online courses to make up for failed 
brick-and-mortar courses). 
 274.  See generally Kim McGuire, Charter Schools Struggling to Meet Academic 
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outcomes in the school system.275 The PEC has created a race to the 
bottom, rather than a race to the top.276 
VI. A BETTER SOLUTION
Could the current divided state of the Twin Cities have been 
avoided? One very clear and straightforward path to a more 
integrated region would have been to more evenly distribute 
subsidized housing across the metropolitan area. A more proactive 
approach to the location of LIHTC, Section 8 project-based 
housing, and Section 8 voucher-eligible rental units could have 
made a serious dent in regional segregation, creating better-
integrated schools. Better-integrated schools, in turn would reduce 
many of the pressures that drive white flight and create housing 
segregation.277 
This is clearly demonstrated by a simulation of the racial make-
up of Twin Cities schools in a region where the existing subsidized 
housing stock is evenly distributed. For the purposes of the 
simulation, an integrated school was defined as one with nonwhite 
enrollment between twenty and sixty percent—a range consistent 
with most definitions.278 In 2012–2013, 230 of the roughly 500 
schools with defined attendance boundaries in the seven-county 
region279 had racial mixes in this range;280 86 schools had nonwhite 
shares greater than 60%; and 175 schools had nonwhite shares less 
than 20%.281 If integrating all schools was achieved simply by having 
 275.  See, e.g., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES, supra note 158, at 13.  
 276.  See generally supra Section III.B (discussing the PEC’s role in promoting 
Minnesota charter schools).  
 277.  See THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 21, at 
8.  
 278.  HALLEY POTTER, KIMBERLY QUICK & ELIZABETH DAVIS, THE CENTURY 
FOUND., A NEW WAVE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/a-new-wave-of-school-integration/ (“Social
scientists and education researchers sometimes use enrollment at or above 70 
percent of a single racial or ethnic group as a threshold for measuring racial 
isolation.”).  
 279.  The “Twin Cities Region” is a “thriving community of nearly 3 million 
people, in 7 counties and 182 communities, encompassing nearly 3,000 square 
miles.” The Twin Cities Region, METRO. COUNCIL, https://metrocouncil.org/About   
-Us/Who-We-Are/The-Twin-Cities-region.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
 280.  This definition excludes charter, magnet, and special purpose schools 
without clearly defined attendance boundaries. 
 281.  See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in this Part. 
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students of appropriate races in the appropriate schools trade 
places, then roughly 12,100 nonwhite students in schools above the 
60% ceiling would have to trade places with 12,100 white students 
in schools below the 20% floor.282 However, a choice program 
would be unlikely to actually result in one-for-one trades across 
schools.283 
Instead, if only 75% of the nonwhite students leaving 
predominantly nonwhite schools were replaced by white students, 
then about 14,850 nonwhite students would have to relocate to 
predominantly white and already-integrated schools in order for all 
schools to be below the 60% ceiling. If 50% of moving nonwhite 
students were replaced by white students, then 17,750 nonwhite 
students would have to move. Although these numbers are non-
trivial, they nonetheless represent only a fraction of nonwhite 
enrollment in the seven-county metropolitan area: in the most 
optimistic scenario, only 7% nonwhite students would change 
schools, while in the least optimistic, only 11% would. In other 
words, integration can still be achieved with relatively minor 
enrollment transfers. 
 Figure 6 (“Table 2”) shows the potential impact of making 
changes in the existing distributions of LIHTC and Section 8 units 
and in the racial mix of subsidized housing residents.284 The 
simulations show the potential integrative impacts if (1) subsidized 
units had been distributed across the region in proportions equal 
to the distribution of students in the region’s schools and (2) the 
racial mix of residents of those units were the same everywhere. 
The children in each of the households in subsidized units were 
then assumed to attend the relevant neighborhood school.285 
 282.  See infra Figure 6 (“Table 2”) in this Part. 
 283.  See, e.g., FAILED PROMISES, supra note 44, at 28, 49. 
284.  Race data is available for LIHTC, Section 8 vouchers, and most (roughly 
two-thirds) Section 8 project-based units. Race distributions for Section 8 project-
based units with no race data were estimated using the racial make-up of the 
Section 8 project-based sites closest to each unit missing data.  
 285.  The number of children per subsidized unit was estimated using 
household data from the United States Bureau of the Census. The number and 
age distribution of children per unit were allowed to vary by race. Children in 
subsidized units were then assigned to the neighborhood elementary, middle, and 
high schools based on the estimated age distribution for all subsidized units 
“assigned” to specific school attendance boundaries. 
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Figure 6. 
The program with the greatest potential impact is the Section 
8 voucher program.286 If Section 8 voucher usage was distributed 
 286.  See Housing Choice Voucher Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
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evenly across the region and the distribution of households was 
race-neutral, a total of 5531 nonwhite students currently in 
predominantly nonwhite schools would instead be attending a 
racially balanced school.287 The fact that the greatest potential for 
pro-integrative actions lies with the voucher program is 
encouraging in one way because changing the regional distribution 
of Section 8 vouchers does not necessarily involve one-for-one 
construction of new units in areas with shortfalls.288 In many areas, 
existing rental units could fill the void simply by increasing the 
number of landlords who accept vouchers.289 On the other hand, 
resistance to vouchers is still significant in many parts of the 
region.290 
Adding the effects of equalizing the distribution of LIHTC and 
Section 8 project-based units increases the total number of 
nonwhite students in racially balanced schools to 9729. This 
represents a very substantial share of the total number of moves 
needed to eliminate racially segregated schools (predominantly 
white as well as predominantly nonwhite) in the region.291 Fully 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher 
_program_section_8 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) 
(2016) (codifying the Section 8 voucher program); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2016) 
(providing the description and purpose of the HUD Housing Choice Voucher 
program). 
 287.  But cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Colorblind Segregation: Equal Protection as 
a Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 870 (2004) (“Even if the 
technical purification of tenant assignment practices and equal distribution of site 
selection were to occur (though there is evidence to the contrary), it would 
provide a feeble corrective for the inertia of thousands of apartments, hundreds of 
developments, and numerous cities ordered according to race.”). 
 288.  See Stephanie DeLuca et al., Segregating Shelter: How Housing Policies Shape 
the Residential Locations of Low-Income Minority Families, 647 ANNALS 268, 273 (2013) 
(“Those that could not be accommodated in the new housing developments were 
given the option to relocate to another public housing project, receive vouchers to 
find rental units in the private market, or relocate without any form of housing 
assistance.”). 
 289.  But cf. Laura Bacon, Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating A Meaningful 
Choice for Housing Choice Voucher Holders, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1273, 1297 (2006) 
(“The widespread refusal of landlords to rent to voucher-holders may be the ‘most 
serious obstacle’ to the utility of the Section 8 Program.”). 
 290.  See generally Christopher Swope, Subsidizing Blight, GOVERNING (May 
2002), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/housing
/Subsidizing-Blight.html (discussing the destabilizing effect of multiple interests 
in the Section 8 voucher program). 
 291.  See Hobday, Finn & Orfield, supra note 173, at 939–40 (“After nearly ten 
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80% of the needed moves would now be unnecessary if the region 
had distributed the existing stock of subsidized housing in a 
location- and race-neutral fashion.292 And even if only 75% of 
nonwhite students leaving predominantly nonwhite schools are 
replaced by white students, two-thirds of the needed “moves” would 
be unnecessary.293 In other words, if subsidized housing was 
currently distributed more equitably, it would be unnecessary to 
even discuss perennially controversial topics like pro-integrative 
school boundary reforms or busing programs. 
These simulations represent fairly rough estimates. And as 
previously discussed, there are forces in education policy that both 
actively promote greater segregation and insulate existing 
segregation from legal and administrative remedies.294 For instance, 
as long as charter schools and open enrollment remain exempted 
from the state’s desegregation rule, privileged racial groups can use 
these alternative education systems as safe enclaves from 
integration.295 
However, despite these caveats, the fundamental message of 
these models is clear. Over long periods of time, relatively modest 
housing policy changes have the potential to make a serious dent in 
school segregation.296 Further, many of these very worthy programs 
currently have long waiting lists for participation.297 If they were 
years of Minnesota’s educational school-choice experiment, segregation in 
Minnesota schools has only intensified—its students of color have steadily become 
more isolated in high-poverty, low-performing schools.”). 
 292.  Myron Orfield, Regional Strategies for Racial Integration of Schools and 
Housing Post-Parents Involved, 29 LAW & INEQ. 149, 165 (2011) (“For instance, if 
LIHTC and project-based Section 8 units were assigned randomly by race and 
located across the region in the same proportions as the overall population, then 
the region would be nearly a third of the way to the goal of integrated schools.”). 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Cf. Cindy Lavorato & Frank Spencer, Back to the Future with Race-Based 
Mandates: A Response to Missed Opportunity, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1747, 1794–
1805 (2010) (detailing the forces of segregation in two Minnesota school districts). 
 295.  Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The 
Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 LAW & INEQ. 269, 340 (2006). 
 296.  J. William Callison, Achieving Our Country: Geographic Desegregation and the 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 101, 118 (2010) 
(“[T]his Article proposes using the Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) program as a tool for improving integration in high-income areas with 
the greatest resources. Advocates for school integration have long argued that 
school integration has a strong, positive impact on residential integration.”). 
297.  Rebecca T. Rotem, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing Act 
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expanded to levels commensurate with demand and modified to 
reflect the modest changes included in the simulations, these 
programs have the potential to eventually create something very 
special in America—a stably integrated regional school system.298 
The longer we leave this opportunity untapped, the more it 
demands to be considered. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The numbers of highly segregated schools and neighborhoods 
in the Twin Cities are increasing rapidly, as is the growth of 
concentrated poverty.299 It does not have to be this way. Minnesota 
had laws to prevent it.300 When they were implemented and 
enforced, they were effective.301 Sadly, political leaders from both 
parties dismantled the civil rights protections designed to prevent 
highly segregated schools.302 Fair housing laws are still on the 
books, but they haven’t guided housing policies for decades.303 
Political leaders are now set to further weaken these laws.304 This 
political apathy has allowed highly profitable engines of 
segregation to flourish in our schools and neighborhoods.305 A 
Claims: Landlord Withdrawal from the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1971, 1978 (2010). 
 298.  Cf. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
1545, 1568–69 (2007) (“While public school choice is an important tool for 
achieving socioeconomic school integration, housing policy offers a 
complementary strategy.”). 
 299.  See supra Part II. 
 300.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.09, 473.25–255 (2016). 
 301.  See supra Part IV. 
 302.  See Christoper P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: 
Importing an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act., 54 
FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 578–79 (1986) (“It is also clear, however, that racially 
neutral practices of business and governmental actors in the housing sphere 
disproportionately limit the housing opportunities of members of protected 
groups.”). Cf. Kriston Capps, Why Democrats and Republicans Need to Talk About 
Affordable Housing, CITYLAB (July 26, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016 
/07/why-democrats-and-republicans-need-to-talk-about-affordable-housing 
/492959/ (explaining that affordable housing is a neutral topic that both parties 
should discuss). 
 303.  See Semuels, supra note 4; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.09. 
 304.  Kriston Capps, What’s at Stake in Trump’s Pick to Lead HUD, CITYLAB (Nov. 
11, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/11/trump-and-the-future-of-fair 
-and-affordable-housing/507269/. 
 305.  See supra Part IV. 
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number of influential entities now have hundreds of millions of 
dollars, thousands of employees, stunning political power, and a 
vested interest in maintaining the segregated society they service.306 
Indeed, as things are today, we could refer to a SHI—segregated 
housing industry—instead of a PHI; the PEC may as well be the 
SPEC. 
One common set of buzzwords used to defend the allocation 
of resources to segregated neighborhoods is “equity in place”: the 
notion that low-income communities of colors can be and should 
be restored from poverty without any fundamental change to living 
patterns.307 But to civil rights advocates, not to mention many 
members of the communities in question, “equity in place” sounds 
suspiciously like “separate but equal.”308 There is, after all, a long 
tradition in American society of asking segregated communities to 
self-improve—while remaining segregated. This approach has not 
been exclusively the province of racists and racial supremacists.309 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, prominent writers and scholars 
(white and nonwhite alike) theorized that freed slaves must 
undergo “moral uplift” before joining middle-class society and that 
otherwise, integration could only bring chaos.310 Today’s 
policymakers use more sensitive language, but sometimes echoes of 
“moral uplift” appear in their recommendations.311 Whether 
because of ideology, convenience, or simple carelessness, both the 
PHI and PEC have at times defended the idea that the solution to 
long-standing racial inequality is not social change but simple 
 306.  See Michelle Adams, Separate and UnEqual: Housing Choice, Mobility, and 
Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413, 430 
(1996) (“But vast residential segregation on the basis of race did not develop 
overnight; its antecedents lie in actions taken by a myriad of private actors, aided 
in substantial part by local, state, and federal governmental entities.”). 
 307.  See Lisa M. Krzewinski, Section 8’s Failure to Integrate: The Interaction of Class-
Based and Racial Discrimination, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 315, 320–21 (2001) 
(reviewing Stephen Grant Meyer’s 2000 book, As Long as They Don’t Move Next Door, 
and stating that “many recipients end up using their subsidies to pay for their 
current low-income housing units or move within their own segregated 
neighborhoods; section 8 is clearly not helping poor minorities leave poor 
minority neighborhoods”). 
 308.  See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (analyzing the “separate but 
equal” doctrine and Jim Crow laws). 
 309.  Frederick C. Harris, The Rise of Respectability Politics, THE DISSENT, Winter 
2014, at 33, 34. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Id. 
60
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/1
  
2017] WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED? 61 
largesse, directed from the government and the wealthy towards 
the poor and the segregated.312 Sometimes, these entities are 
altruistic and genuinely well-meaning, but history and social 
science alike show that their approach will probably never succeed. 
For policymakers and politicians still interested in integration, 
there is also an important broader lesson in the Twin Cities’ return 
to segregation. For many years, civil rights advocates have treated 
segregation as primarily a product of white racism.313 But the 
Minnesota experience shows that racial separation isn’t always 
driven solely by a desire to exclude. When policymakers become 
apathetic about integration, economic forces and interest group 
politics can work in concert to pull nonwhite citizens into 
undesirable neighborhoods and failing schools, just as surely as 
racism can keep the same beleaguered minorities out of white 
enclaves.314 Because of this, true and permanent integration cannot 
be effected by simply overcoming racial animus; advocates must 
also overcome institutions that have grown up around a segregated 
society and ultimately draw purpose from a segregated status quo. 
Some of these same institutions may profess to represent a 
progressive outlook or even work to help segregation’s victims. 
Nonetheless, they remain invested in a society where racial 
concentration is preserved, not remedied. If these forces are not 
accounted for, even regions that have made remarkable progress 
can backslide into racial separation and isolation. This is what 
happened in Minnesota. Exclusionary pressures were comparatively 
weak in Minneapolis and Saint Paul. Advocates of integration 
assumed this alone was enough to create lasting social change. 
They were wrong. 
But it is not too late to create a truly integrated society. Doing 
so would require a number of steps. Existing fair housing laws must 
be maintained and enforced. Fundamental civil rights protections 
must be applied to all parts of public education.315 Governments 
and foundations must recommit to a racially integrated society, the 
society that was Martin Luther King’s dream and that most 
Americans still aspire to. Public and philanthropic funds should go 
 312.  See supra Part IV. 
 313.  J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND
THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 67 (1999). 
 314.  See supra Part III. 
315.  john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 
MINN. L. REV. 749, 792–93 (1996). 
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to organizations that affirmatively further fair housing practices, 
not to those whose activities perpetuate segregation. And these 
commitments must extend to the entire Twin Cities area, not just 
to underprivileged pockets in Minneapolis and Saint Paul. The 
poverty housing industry should become a partnership for 
integrated housing; the poverty education complex should become 
a partnership for equal opportunity in integrated schools. 
Changing our current course will involve hard work and it may be 
less profitable for many of the entities that currently control 
housing and education policy. But our Minnesota values say that it 
is necessary, and our history shows that it is possible. 
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